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I show how probabilities arise in quantum physics by exploring implications of environment -
assisted invariance or envariance, a recently discovered symmetry exhibited by entangled quantum
systems. Envariance of perfectly entangled “Bell-like” states can be used to rigorously justify com-
plete ignorance of the observer about the outcome of any measurement on either of the members
of the entangled pair. For more general states, envariance leads to Born’s rule, pk ∝ |ψk|
2 for the
outcomes associated with Schmidt states. Probabilities derived in this manner are an objective re-
flection of the underlying state of the system – they represent experimentally verifiable symmetries,
and not just a subjective “state of knowledge” of the observer. Envariance - based approach is
compared with and found superior to pre-quantum definitions of probability including the standard
definition based on the ‘principle of indifference’ due to Laplace, and the relative frequency approach
advocated by von Mises. Implications of envariance for the interpretation of quantum theory go
beyond the derivation of Born’s rule: Envariance is enough to establish dynamical independence of
preferred branches of the evolving state vector of the composite system, and, thus, to arrive at the
environment - induced superselection (einselection) of pointer states, that was usually derived by
an appeal to decoherence. Envariant origin of Born’s rule for probabilities sheds a new light on the
relation between ignorance (and hence, information) and the nature of quantum states.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to derive Born’s rule [1] and
to identify and analyse origins of probability and ran-
domness in physics. The key idea we shall employ is
environment - assisted invariance (or envariance) [2-4],
a recently discovered quantum symmetry of entangled
systems. Envariance allows one to use purity (perfect
knowledge) of a joint state of an entangled pair to char-
acterize unknown states of either of its components and
to quantify missing information about either member of
the pair.
The setting of our discussion is essentially the same
as in the study of decoherence and einselection [3,5-9].
However, the tools we shall employ differ. Thus, as in
decoherence, the system of interest S is “open” and can
be entangled with its environment E . We shall, however,
refrain from using “trace” and “reduced density matrix”.
Their physical significance is based on Born’s rule [10,11].
Therefore, to avoid circularity, we shall focus on pure
global quantum states which yield – as a consequence
of envariance – mixed states of their components. Suc-
cessful derivation of Born’s rule will in turn justify the
usual interpretation of these formal tools while shedding
a new light on the foundations of quantum theory and
its relation with information.
The nature of “missing information” and the origin of
probabilities in quantum physics are two related themes,
closely tied to its interpretation. We will be therefore
forced to examine, in light of envariance, the structure
of the whole interpretational edifice. These fragments
that depend on decoherence and einselection will have
to be rebuilt without the standard tools such as trace
and reduced density matrices. Once Born’s rule is “off
limits”, the problem becomes not just to derive proba-
bilities, and, thus, to crown the already largely finished
structure with pk = |ψk|2 as a final touch. Rather, the
task is to deconstruct the interpretational edifice stand-
ing on an incomplete, shaky foundation, and to re-build
it using these elements of the old plan that are still vi-
able, but on a new, solid and deep foundations and, to a
large extent, from new, more basic building blocks. We
start in the next section with the proof that leads from
envariance to Born’s rule. This will provide an overview
of key ideas and their implications.
The original presentations of envariance [2-4] as well
as most of this paper assume that quantum theory is
universally valid. They rely only on unitary quantum
evolutions and thus can be (as is decoherence) conve-
niently explored in the relative state framework [12] (al-
though their results are independent of interpretation).
One may equally well – as was emphasized by Howard
Barnum [13] – analyze envariance in a ‘Copenhagen set-
ting’ that includes the collapse postulate. Section II by-
passes the discussion of quantum measurements and is in
that sense most explicitly interpretation - neutral study
of the consequences of envariance.
The goal of this paper is to understand the nature of
probabilities and to derive Born’s rule in bare quantum
theory. Thus, only unitary evolutions are allowed. The
effective collapse (usually modeled with the help deco-
herence, which is in effect “off limits” here) is all one can
hope for. The ground for the solution of the problem of
the emergence of probabilities in this setting is explored
and prepared in Section III. We start by comparing en-
variant definition of probability with the approaches used
in classical physics, and go on to examine quantum mea-
surements. “Symptoms of the classical” (such as the pre-
ferred basis) that are taken for granted in justifying the
need for probabilities and are usually derived with the
2help of the trace operation and reduced density matrices
are pointed out. As these tools depend on Born’s rule,
their physical implications such as decoherence and ein-
selection have to be re-examined and often re-derived if
we are to avoid circularity, and we set the stage for this
in Section III.
Preferred pointer states are such a necessary pre-
condition for the emergence of the classical. Pointer
states define what information is missing – what are the
potential measurement outcomes, providing ‘menu’ of the
alternative future events the observer may be ignorant of.
Hence, they are indispensable in defining probabilities.
Pointer states are recovered in Section IV without deco-
herence – without relying on tools that implicitly invoke
Born’s rule: We show how environment - induced super-
selection can be understood through direct appeal to the
nature of the quantum correlations, and, in particular, to
envariance. This pivotal result – in a sense ‘einselection
without decoherence’ – allows us to avoid any circularity
in the discussion. It is based on the analysis of correla-
tions between the system and the apparatus pointer (or
the memory of the observer) in presence of the environ-
ment. It allows one to define future events – “buds” of the
dynamically independent branches that can be assigned
probabilities.
Section V discusses probabilities from the “personal
point of view” of an observer described by quantum the-
ory. Probabilities arise when the outcome of a measure-
ment that is about to be performed cannot be predicted
with certainty from the available data, even though ob-
server knows all that can be known – the initial pure
state of the system.
Relative frequencies of outcomes are considered in the
light of envariance in section VI, shedding a new light
on the connection between envariance and the statistical
implications of quantum states.
In course of the analysis we shall discover that none
of the standard classical approaches to probability apply
directly in quantum theory. In a sense, common state-
ment of the goal – “recovering classical probabilities in
the quantum setting” – may have been the key obstacle
in making progress because it was not ambitious enough.
To be sure, it was understood long ago that none of the
traditional approaches to the definition of probability in
the classical world were all that convincing: They were
either too subjective (relying on the analysis of observers’
“state of mind”, his lack of knowledge about the actual
state) or too artificial (requiring infinite ensembles).
Complementarity of quantum theory provides the
‘missing ingredient’ that allows us to define probabilities
using objective properties of entangled quantum states:
Observer can know completely a global pure state of a
composite system. That global state will have objec-
tive symmetries: They can be experimentally verified and
confirmed using transformations and measurements that
yield outcomes with certainty (and, hence, that do not
involve Born’s rule). These objective properties of the
global state imply – as we shall see – probabilities for the
states of local subsystems. Perfect information about the
whole can be thus used to demonstrate and quantify ig-
norance about a part. Circularity of classical approaches
(which assume ignorance – e.g., “equal likelihood” – to
establish ignorance – probabilities) is avoided: Proba-
bilities enter as an objective property of a state. They
reflect perfect knowledge (rather than ignorance) of the
observer. These and other interpretational issues are dis-
cussed in Section VII.
This paper can be read either in the order of presen-
tation, or ‘like an onion’, starting from the outer layers
(Sections II and VII, followed by III and IV, etc.)
II. PROBABILITIES FROM ENVARIANCE
To derive Born’s rule we recognize that;
(o) the Universe consists of systems;
(i) a completely known (pure) state of system S can be
represented by a normalized vector in its Hilbert
space HS ;
(ii) a composite pure state of several systems is a vec-
tor in the tensor product of the constituent Hilbert
spaces;
(iii) states evolve in accord with the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion ih¯|ψ˙〉 = H |ψ〉 where H is hermitean.
In other words, we start with the usual assumptions of
the ‘no collapse’ part of quantum mechanics. We have
listed them here in a somewhat more ‘fine-grained’ man-
ner than it is often seen, e.g. in Ref. [3].
A. Environment - assisted invariance
Envariance is a symmetry of composite quantum
states: When a state |ψSE〉 of a pair of systems S, E
can be transformed by US = uS ⊗ 1E acting solely on S,
US |ψSE〉 = (uS ⊗ 1E)|ψSE〉 = |ηSE〉 , (1a)
but the effect of US can be undone by acting solely on E
with an appropriately chosen UE = 1S ⊗ uE :
UE |ηSE〉 = (1S ⊗ uE)|ηSE 〉 = |ψSE〉 , (1b)
then |ψSE〉 is called envariant under US .
In contrast to the usual symmetries (that describe sit-
uations when the action of some transformation has no
effect on some object) envariance is an assisted symme-
try: The global state is transformed by US , but can be
restored by acting on E , some other subsystem of the Uni-
verse, physically distinct (e.g., spatially separated) from
S. We shall call the part of the global state that can be
acted upon to affect such a restoration of the preexisting
global state the environment E . Hence, the environment
3- assisted invariance, or – for brevity – envariance. We
shall soon see that there may be more than one such
subsystem. In that case we shall use E to designate their
union. Moreover, on occasion we shall consider manipu-
lating or measuring E . So the oft repeated (and largely
unjustified; see Refs. [3,4,8,14,15]) phrase ‘inaccessible
environment’ should not be taken for granted here.
Envariance of pure states is a purely quantum sym-
metry: Classical state of a composite system is given
by Cartesian (rather than tensor) product of its con-
stituents. So, to completely know the state of a com-
posite classical system one must know the state of each
of its parts. It follows that when one part of a classi-
cal composite system is affected by the analogue of US ,
the “damage” cannot be undone – the state of the whole
cannot be restored – by acting on some other part of the
whole. Hence, pure classical states are never envariant.
Another way of stating this conclusion is to note that
states of classical objects are ‘absolute’, while in quan-
tum theory there are situations – entanglement – in which
states are relative. That is, in classical physics one would
need to ‘adjust’ the remainder of the universe to exhibit
envariance, while in quantum physics it suffices to act
on systems entangled with the system of interest. For
instance, in a hypothetical classical universe containing
two and only two objects, a boost applied to either object
could be countered by simultaneously applying the same
boost to the other: The only motion in such a two - ob-
ject universe is relative. Therefore, simultaneous boosts
would make the new state of that hypothetical universe
indistingushable from (and, hence, identical to) the ini-
tial pre-boost state. This will not work in our Universe,
as the center of mass of the two boosted objects will be
now moving with respect to the rest of its matter con-
tent. (That is, unless we make the second object the rest
of our Universe: this thought experiment brings to mind
the famous ‘Newton’s bucket’ – i.e., Newton’s suspicion
that the meniscus formed by water rotating in a bucket
would disappear if the rest of the Universe was forced to
co-rotate.)
To give an example of envariance, consider Schmidt
decomposition of ψSE ;
|ψSE〉 =
N∑
k=1
ak|sk〉|εk〉 . (2)
Above, by definition of Schmidt decomposition, {|sk〉}
and {|εk〉} are orthonormal and ak are complex. Any
pure bipartite state can be written this way. A whole
class of envariant transformations can be identified for
such pure entangled quantum states:
Lemma 1. Any unitary transformation with Schmidt
eigenstates {|sk〉};
uS =
N∑
k=1
exp(iφk)|sk〉〈sk| , (3a)
is envariant.
Proof: Indeed, any unitary with Schmidt eigenstates can
be undone by a ‘countertransformation’:
uE =
N∑
k=1
exp(−iφk + 2πlk)|εk〉〈εk| (3b)
where lk are arbitrary integers. QED.
Remark: The environment used to undo uS need not be
uniquely defined: For example, uS acting on a GHZ-like
state:
|ψSEE′〉 =
N∑
k=1
ak|sk〉|εk〉|ε′k〉 (4a)
can be envariantly undone by acting either on E or on E ′,
or by acting on both parts of the joint environment.
It is perhaps useful to point out that one can use ψSEE′
to obtain reduced density matrix:
ρSE =
∑
k
|ak|2|sk〉〈sk| ⊗ |εk〉〈εk| (4b)
This means that even when the correlated state of S and
E is mixed and of this form, one can in principle imagine
that there is an underlying pure state. States of the above
form can arise in measurements or as a consequence of
decoherence. The discussion can be thus re-phrased in
terms of pure states in all cases of interest. The assump-
tion of suitable pure global state entails no loss of gener-
ality.
At first sight, envariance may not seem to be all that
significant, since it is possible to show that it can affect
only phases:
Lemma 2. All envariant unitary transformations have
eigenstates that coincide with the Schmidt expansion of
|ψSE〉, i.e., have the form of Eq. (3a).
Proof is by contradiction: Suppose there is an envari-
ant unitary u˜S that cannot be made co-diagonal with
Schmidt basis of ψSE , Eq. (2). It will then inevitably
transform Schmidt states of S:
u˜S⊗1E |ψSE〉 =
N∑
k=1
ak(u˜S |sk〉)|εk〉 =
N∑
k=1
ak|s˜k〉|εk〉 = |η˜SE〉 .
If u˜S is envariant there must be u˜E such that
1E ⊗ u˜E |η˜SE〉 =
N∑
k=1
ak|sk〉|εk〉 = |ψSE〉 .
But unitary transformations acting exclusively on HE
cannot change states in HS . So, the new set of Schmidt
states |s˜k〉 of η˜SE cannot be undone (‘rotated back’) to
|sk〉 by any u˜E . It follows that – when Schmidt states
are uniquely defined – there can be no envariant unitary
transformation that acts on the environment and restores
the global state to ψSE after Schmidt states of S were al-
tered by u˜S . QED.
4Corollary: Properties of global states are envariant iff
they are a function of the phases of the Schmidt coeffi-
cients.
Phases are often regarded as inaccessible, and are even
sometimes dismissed as unimportant (textbooks tend to
speak of a ‘ray’ in the Hilbert space, thus defining a state
modulo its phase). Indeed, Schmidt expansion is occa-
sionally defined by absorbing phases in the states which
means that all the non-zero coefficients end up real and
positive (and hence all the phases are taken to be zero).
This is a dangerous oversimplification. Phases matter –
reader can verify that it is impossible to write all of the
Bell states when all the relative phases are set to zero.
Indeed, the aim of the rest of this paper is, in a sense, to
carefully justify when and for what purpose phases can be
disregarded, and to understand nature of the ignorance
about the local state of the system as a consequence of
the global nature of these phases.
B. State of a subsystem of a quantum system
Independence of the state of the system S from phases
of the Schmidt coefficients will be our first important
conclusion based on envariance. To establish it we list
below three facts – additional assumptions that may be
regarded as obvious. We state them here explicitly to
clarify and extend the meaning of terms ‘(sub)system’
and ‘state’ we have already used in axioms (o) - (iii).
Fact 1: Unitary transformations must act on the system
to alter its state. (That is, when the evolution op-
erator does not operate on the Hilbert space HS of
the system, i.e., when it has a form ...⊗1S ⊗ ... the
state of S remains the same.)
Fact 2: The state of the system S is all that is needed
(and all that is available) to predict measurement
outcomes, including their probabilities.
Fact 3: The state of a larger composite system that in-
cludes S as a subsystem is all that is needed (and
all that is available) to determine the state of the
system S.
We have already implicitly appealed to fact 1 earlier, e.g.
in the proof of Lemma 2. Note that the above facts are
interpretation - neutral and that states (e.g., ‘the state
of S’) they refer to need not be pure.
With the help of the facts can now establish:
Theorem 1. For an entangled global state of the sys-
tem and the environment all measurable properties of S
– including probabilities of various outcomes – cannot
depend on the phases of Schmidt coefficients: The state
of S has to be completely determined by the set of pairs
{|αk|, |sk〉}.
Proof: Envariant transformation uS could affect the
state of S. However, by definition of envariance the effect
of uS can be undone by a countertransformation of the
form 1S ⊗ uE which – by fact 1 – cannot alter the state
of S. As SE is returned to the initial state, it follows
from fact 3 that the state of S must have been also re-
stored. But (by fact 1) it could not have been effected by
the countertransformation. So it must have been left un-
changed by the envariant uS in the first place. It follows
(from the above and (fact 2) that measurable properties
of S are unaffected by envariant transformations. But,
by Lemma 1 & 2, envariant transformations can alter
phases and only phases of Schmidt coefficients. There-
fore, any measurable property of S implied by its state
must indeed be completely determined by the set of pairs
{|αk|, |sk〉}. QED.
Remark: Information content of the list {|αk|, |sk〉}
that describes the state of S is the same as the informa-
tion content of the reduced density matrix. We do not
know yet, however, what are the probabilities of various
outcome states |sk〉.
Thus, envariance of Schmidt phases proves that only
absolute values of Schmidt coefficients can influence mea-
surement outcomes. Yet, the dismissive attitude towards
phases we have reported above is incorrect. This is best
illustrated on an example: Changing phases between the
Hadamard states;
|±〉 = (|s1〉 ± |s2〉)/
√
2
can change the state of the system from |s1〉 to |s2〉. More
generally;
Lemma 3. Iff the Schmidt decomposition of Eq. (2) has
coefficients that have the same absolute value – that is,
the state is even:
|ψ¯SE〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
eiφk |sk〉|εk〉 , (5)
it is also envariant under a swap:
uS(1⇀↽ 2) = eiφ12 |s1〉〈s2|+ h.c. (6a)
Proof: By Lemma 1, swap is envariant – it can be gener-
ated by uS diagonal in Hadamard basis of the two states
(which is also Schmidt when their coefficients differ only
by a phase). Swaps can be seen to be envariant also more
directly: When a1 = |a|eiφ1 , a2 = |a|eiφ2 , every swap can
be undone by the corresponding counterswap:
uE(1⇀↽ 2) = e−i(φ12+φ1−φ2+2pil12)|ε1〉〈ε2|+ h.c. (6b)
This proves envariance of swaps for equal values of the
coefficients of the swapped states. Converse follows from
Lemma 1 & 2: Envariant transformations can affect only
phases of Schmidt coefficients, so the global state can-
not be restored after the swap when their absolute values
differ. QED.
Remark: When SE is in an even state |ψ¯SE〉 (that is
therefore envariant under swaps) exchange |s1〉 ⇀↽ |s2〉
does not affect the state of S – its consequences cannot
be detected by any measurement of S alone.
Lemma 3 we have just established is the cornerstone
of our approach. We now know that when the global
5state of SE is even (i.e., with equal absolute values of
its Schmidt coefficients), then a swap (which predictably
takes known |sk〉 into |sl〉) does not alter the state of S
at all.
Envariantly swappable state of the system defines per-
fect ignorance. We emphasize the direction of this impli-
cation: The state of S is provably completely unknown
not because of the subjective ignorance of the oberver.
Rather, it is unknown as a consequence of complemen-
tarity: the state of SE is after all perfectly known. More-
over, it can be objectively known to many observers. All
of them will agree that their perfect global knowledge
implies complete local ignorance. Therefore, probabilities
are objective properties of this state.
Symmetries of the state of SE imply ignorance of the
observer about the outcomes of his future measurements
on S. This emergence of objective probabilities is purely
quantum. Objective probabilities are incompatible with
classical setting (where there is an unknown but definite
preexisting state). In the quantum setting, objective na-
ture of probabilities arises as a consequence of the entan-
glement, e.g., with the environment.
C. Born’s rule from envariance
So far, we have avoided refering to probabilities. Apart
from brief mention in fact 2 and immediately above we
have not discussed how do they relate to quantum mea-
surements. This will have to wait for when we consider
quantum measurements, records and observers from an
envariant point of view. But it turns out that one can
derive the rule connecting probabilities with entangled
state vectors such as |ψSE〉 of Eq. (2) from relatively
modest assumptions about their properties. The next
key step in this direction is:
Theorem 2. Probabilities of Schmidt states of S that
appear in |ψSE〉 with coefficients that have same absolute
value are equal.
There are several inequivalent ways to establish The-
orem 2. Indeed, the reader may feel that it was already
established: Remark that followed Lemma 3 plus a rudi-
mentary symmetry arguments suffice to do just that.
However, for completeness, we now spell out some of
these arguments in more detail. Both Barnum [13] and
Schlosshauer and Fine [16] have discussed some of the
related issues. Reporting some of their conclusions (and
anticipating some of ours) it appears that envariance plus
a variety of small subsets of natural assumptions suffice
to arrive at the thesis of Theorem 2.
1. Envariance under complete swaps
We start with the first version of the proof:
(a) When operations that swap any two orthonormal
states leave the state of S unchanged, probabili-
ties of the outcomes associated with these states are
equal.
Proof (a) is immediate. When the entangled state
of SE has equal values of the Schmidt coefficients, e.g.
|ψ¯SE〉 ∝
∑N
k=1 e
iφk |sk〉|εk〉, local state of S will be in-
deed unaffected by the swaps (by Theorem 1 and Lemma
3 above). Consequently, with the assumption (a), thesis
of Theorem 2 follows. QED.
The above argument is close in the spirit to Laplace’s
“principle of indifference” [17]. We prove that swapping
possible outcome states – shuffling cards – “makes no
difference”. However, in contrast to Laplace we show
‘objective indifference’ of the physical state of the system
in question rather than observers subjective indifference
based on his state of knowledge.
Note that in absence of entanglement (and, hence en-
variance) swap generally changes the underlying state of
the system also when coefficients of states corresponding
to various potential outcomes have the same absolute val-
ues. For example, pure states |α〉 ∝ |1〉 + |2〉 − |3〉 + |4〉
and |β〉 ∝ |1〉+ |3〉− |2〉+ |4〉 are orthogonal even though
they have the same absolute values of the coefficients
and differ only by a swap. Thus, without entanglement
with the environment (i.e., in absence of Lemma 1 & 2
and, hence, Theorem 1 that allows one to ignore phases
of Schmidt coefficients) assumption (a) would be tan-
tamount to assertion that phases of the coefficients are
unimportant in specifying the state. For isolated sys-
tems this is obviously wrong, in blatant conflict with the
quantum principle of superposition!
In absence of envariance the key to our argument –
assertion that the state of S is left unchanged by a swap
– is simply wrong. This is easily seen by considering
ensemble of identical pure states (such as |α〉). Through
measurements, observer can find out the state of systems
in that ensemble (e.g., |α〉 or |β〉). By contrast, if this
ensemble becomes first entangled with the environment
in such a way that |1〉 . . . |4〉 are Schmidt, an observer
with access to S only would conclude that the state of
the system is a perfect mixture, and would not be able
to tell if the pre-decoherence state was |α〉 or |β〉.
2. Envariance under partial swaps and dynamics
The second strategy we shall use to prove Theorem
2 relies on a somewhat different ‘dynamical’ definition
of indifference. We note that when we have some in-
formation about the state, we should be able to “detect
motion” (possibly using an ensemble of such states) – to
observe changes caused by the dynamical evolution. This
intuition is captured by our assumption:
(b) When the state of S is left unchanged by all conceiv-
able unitary transformations acting on a subspace
H˜S of HS , then probabilities of all the outcomes of
any exhaustive measurement corresponding to any
6orthocomplete basis that spans that subspace of H˜S
are the same.
To proceed we first establish that when complete swaps,
Eq. (6a), between a subset of states of some orthonormal
basis that spans H˜S leave the state of S unchanged, then
so do partial swaps on the same subspace:
Lemma 4: Partial swaps defined by pairwise exchange
of any two orthonormal basis sets {|sk〉} and {|s˜l〉} that
span even subspace H¯S of HS which admits full swaps,
Eq. (6a) – are also envariant.
Proof: Partial swap can be expressed as a unitary;
u˜S({s˜k}⇀↽ {sk}) =
∑
|sk〉∈H¯S
|s˜k〉〈sk| . (6c)
This is the obvious generalization of the simple swap of
Eq. (6a). u˜S({s˜k} ⇀↽ {sk}) can be undone by the cor-
responding partial counterswap of the Schmidt partners
of the swapped pairs of states. It follows from Lemma
3 that ψ¯SE – a state envariant under complete swaps –
must have a form:
|ψ¯SE〉 ∝
K∑
k=1
eiφk |sk〉|εk〉
where K = Dim(H¯S). Basis {|s˜l〉} spans the same sub-
space H¯S . Therefore,
|ψ¯SE〉 ∝
K∑
l=1
|s˜l〉(
K∑
k=1
eiφk〈s˜l|sk〉|εk〉) =
K∑
l=1
|s˜l〉|ε˜l〉 .
Given that {|εk〉} are Schmidt, it is straightforward to
verify that {|ε˜l〉} are orthonormal, and, therefore, the
expansion on RHS above is also Schmidt. Consequently;
u˜E({ε˜k}⇀↽ {εk}) =
∑
εk∈H¯E
|ε˜k〉〈εk| , (6d)
the desired partial counterswap exists. This establishes
envariance under partial swaps. QED.
Corollary: When complete swaps are envariant in the
subspace H¯S ∈ HS , so are all the unitary transformations
on H¯S . Indeed, the set of all partial swaps is the same
as the set of all unitary transformations on the subspace
H¯S .
We can now give the second proof of Theorem 2:
Proof (b): Equality of probabilities under envariant
swaps follows immediately from the above Corollary and
assumption (b). QED.
Using Lemma 4 and its Corollary, we can identify
mathematical objects that represent even states in HS :
Only a uniform distribution of pure states over H¯S is
invariant under all unitaries. The alternative representa-
tion that is more familiar is the (reduced) density matrix.
It has to be proportional to the identity operator:
ρS ∝ 1S ,
to be invariant under all unitaries.
So envariance, the no collapse axioms (o)-(iii), plus the
three facts imply that our abstract state (whose role is
defined by fact 2) leads to the distribution uniform in
the Haar measure or, equivalently to the reduced density
matrix ∝ 1S within H¯S . Note that these conclusions
follow from Lemma 4, which does not employ assumption
(b). The form of the mathematical object representing
envariantly swappable state of S follows directly from the
symmteries of the underlying entangled composite state
of SE . In particular, we have in a sense obtained the
reduced density matrix in the special case without the
usual arguments [10,11], i.e., without relying on Born’s
rule. Moreover, assumption (b) is needed only when we
want to interpret that reduced density matrix in terms
of probabilities.
Assumption (b) can also be regarded as a quantum
counterpart of Laplace’s principle of indifference [17].
Now there are however even more obvious differences be-
tween the quantum situation and shuffling cards than
these we have already mentioned in the discussion of
proof (a). Classical deck cannot be shuffled into a super-
position of the original cards. This can obviously hap-
pen to a ‘quantum deck’: In quantum physics we can
consider arbitrary unitary transformations (and not just
discrete swaps). This consequence of the nature of quan-
tum evolutions can be traced all the way to the principle
of superposition (and, hence, to phases!).
The other distinction between the quantum and clas-
sical principle of indifference we have already noted is
even more striking: In classical physics it was the “state
of knowledge” of the observer – his description of the
system – that may (or may not) have been altered by
the evolution – the underlying physical state was always
affected when shuffling / evolution was non-trivial. In
quantum theory there is no distinction between the epis-
temic ‘state of knowledge’ role of the state and its ob-
jective (‘ontic’) role. In this sense quantum states are
‘epiontic’ [3].
Probabilities are – in any case – an objective reflection
of symmetries of such states: They follow from quantum
complementarity between the global and local observ-
ables. They can be defined and quantified using envari-
ance, an experimentally verifiable property of entangled
quantum states.
3. Equal probabilities from perfect SE correlations
Both of the proofs above start with the assumption
that under certain conditions probabilities of a subset of
states of the system are equal, and then establish the
thesis by showing that this assumption is implied by en-
variance under swaps – both are in that sense Laplacean.
The third proof also starts with an assumption of equal-
ity of probabilities, but now we consider relation between
the probabilities of the Schmidt states of S and E . This
approach (Barnum [13], see also discussion in Ref. [16])
7recognizes that pairs of Schmidt states (|sk〉|εk〉 in Eq.
(2)) are perfectly correlated, which implies that they have
the same probabilities. Thus, one can prove equality of
probabilities of envariantly swappable Schmidt states di-
rectly from envariance by relying on perfect correlations
between Schmidt states of S and E .
To demonstrate this equality we consider a subspace
of HS spanned by Schmidt states |sk〉 and |sl〉, so that
the corresponding fragment of ψSE is given by:
|ψSE〉 = . . .+ ak|sk〉|εk〉+ al|sl〉|εl〉+ . . .
We assume that:
(c) In the Schmidt decomposition partners are perfectly
correlated, i.e., detection of |sk〉 implies that in
a subsequent measurement of Schmidt observable
(i.e., observable with Schmidt eigenstates) on E will
certainly obtain |εk〉 (this ‘partner state’ will be
recorded with certainty, e.g., with probability 1).
Proof (c): From assumption (c) we immediately have
that
pS(sk(l)) = pE(εk(l)) .
Consider now a swap sk ⇀↽ sl. It leads from ψSE , Eq.
(2), to:
|ηS˜E〉 = . . .+ ak|sl〉|εk〉+ al|sk〉|εl〉+ . . .
Now, using again (c) we get;
pS˜(sk(l)) = pE(εl(k)) = pS(sl(k)) .
In effect, this establishes the ‘pedantic assumption’ of
[2,3] using envariance and perfect correlation assump-
tion (c): Probabilities get exchanged when the states are
swapped. So we could go back to the proof of Ref. [2]
with a somewhat different motivation. But we can also
continue, and consider a counterswap in E that yields:
|ϑS˜E˜〉 = . . .+ ak|sl〉|εl〉+ al|sk〉|εk〉+ . . .
We now consider the case when |ak| = |al| = a. Coun-
terswap restores such an even state;
|ϑ¯S˜E˜〉 = . . .+ a|sl〉|εl〉+ a|sk〉|εk〉+ . . . = |ψ¯SE〉 .
By facts 2 and 3 the overall state as well as the state
of S must have been restored to the original. Therefore
pS˜(sl(k)) = pS(sl(k)). Together with pS˜(sl(k)) = pS(sk(l))
established before this yields:
pS(sl(k)) = pS(sk(l))
when the relevant Schmidt coefficients have equal abso-
lute values. QED.
We have now established that in an entangled state in
which all of the coefficients have the same absolute value
so that every state |sk〉 can be envariantly swapped with
every other state |sl〉, |ψ¯SE〉 ∝
∑N
k=1 e
iφk |sk〉|εk〉, all the
possible orthonormal outcome states have the same prob-
ability. Let us also assume that states that do not appear
in the above superposition (i.e., appear with Schmidt co-
efficient zero) have zero probability. (We shall motivate
this rather natural assumption later in the paper.) Given
the customary normalisation of probabilities we get for
even (‘Bell-like’) states:
Corollary For states with equal absolute values of
Schmidt coefficients;
pk = p(sk) = 1/N ∀k . (7a)
Moreover, probability of any subset of n mutually ex-
clusive events is additive. Hence:
pk1∨k2∨...∨kn = p(sk1 ∨ sk2 ∨ . . . ∨ skn) = n/N . (7b)
Above, we have assumed that orthogonal states corre-
spond to mutually exclusive events. We shall motivate
also this (very natural) assumption of the additivity of
probabilities further in discussion of quantum measure-
ments in Section V (thus going beyond the starting point
of e.g. Gleason[30]). Here we only note that while addi-
tivity of probabilities looks innocent, in the quantum case
(where the principle of superposition entitles one to add
complex amplitudes) it should not be taken for granted.
In the end, we shall conclude that additivity of probabili-
ties is tied to envariance, which yields phases (and, hence,
quantum superposition principle) irrelevant for Schmidt
states of the subsystems of the entagled whole.
We also note that the probability entered our discus-
sion in a manner that bypasses circularity: We have sim-
ply identified certainty with the probability of 1 (see e.g.
assumption (c) above). This provides us with the nor-
malization, while the symmetries revealed by envariance
determine probabilities in the case when there is no cer-
tainty.
D. Born’s rule: the case of unequal coefficients
To complete derivation of Born’s rule consider the case
when the absolute values of the coefficients ak in the
Schmidt decomposition are proportional to
√
mk, where
mk are natural numbers.
|ψSE〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
√
mke
iφk |sk〉|εk〉 . (8a)
We now introduce a counterweight / counter C. It can
be thought of either as a subsystem extracted from the
environment E , or as an ancilla that becomes correlated
with E so that the combined state is:
|ψSEC〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
√
mke
iφk |sk〉|εk〉|Ck〉 (8b)
8where {|Ck〉} are orthonormal. Moreover, we assume
that |Ck〉 are associated with subspaces ofHC of sufficient
dimensionality so that the ‘fine-graining’ represented by:
|Ck〉 =
µk∑
jk=µk−1+1
|cjk〉/
√
mk (9a)
is possible. Above, µk = µk−1 +mk, and µ0 = 0.
We also utilize a c-shift, a c-not - like gate[3] that
correlates states of E with the fine-grained states of C:
|cjk〉|εk〉 −→ |cjk〉|ejk〉 , (9b)
where |ejk〉 are orthonormal states of E that correlate
with the individual states of the counter C (e.g., causing
decoherence). We have now arrived at the state vector
that represents a perfectly entangled (equal coefficient,
or ‘even’) state of the composite system consisting of SC
and E :
|ΨSEC〉 ∝
M∑
jk=1
eiφjk |sk(jk), cjk〉|ejk〉 . (8c)
Above,M =
∑N
k=1mk = µN , and k = k(j) is the obvious
“staircase” function, i.e. when µk−1 < j ≤ µk, then
k(j) = k.
The state ΨSEC is envariant under swaps of joint
Schmidt states |sk(jk), cjk〉 of SC. Hence, by Eq. (7a):
pjk ≡ p(cjk) ≡ p(|sk(jk), cjk〉) = 1/M
Moreover, Eq. (7b) implies that if we were to enquire
about the probability of the state of S alone, the answer
must be given by:
pk ≡
µk∑
jk=µk−1+1
p(|sk(jk), cjk〉) = mk/M = |ak|2 . (10)
This is Born’s rule. The extension to the case where |ak|2
are incommensurate is straightforward by continuity as
rational numbers are dense among reals.
III. ENVARIANCE, IGNORANCE, AND
CHANCE
We have now presented a fairly complete discussion of
envariance, and we have derived Born’s rule. The aim of
the rest of this paper is to consider some of the other im-
plications of envariance for our quantum Universe. This
section serves the role of the intermission after the first
act of a play. The basic plot is already in place. We
can now take a few moments to speculate on how it will
develop. In particular, we shall compare definition of
probabilities based on envariance with the pre-quantum
discussions of this concept. We shall also set the stage for
the investigation of the implications of envariance for the
interpretation of quantum theory. This includes (but is
not limited to) the issue of the ‘decoherence-free’ deriva-
tion of the preferred pointer basis.
A. Envariance and the ‘principle of indifference’
The idea that invariance under swaps implies ignorance
and hence probabilities is old, and goes back at least to
Laplace [17]. We illustrate it in Fig. 1a. The appeal to in-
variance under swaps leads to a definition that is known
as ‘standard’ (or, sometimes, ‘classical’ – the adjective
we reserve in this paper for its other obvious meaning).
In classical physics standard definition has to be applied
with apologies, as it refers to observers’ subjective lack
of knowledge about the system, rather than to the ob-
jective properties of state of the system per se. That
the observer (player) does not care about (is indifferent
to) swapping of the cards in a shuffled deck is the con-
sequence of the fact that he does not know their ‘face
values’. It is a subjective reason – not reflected in the
objective symmetries of the actual state of the deck (see
Fig. 1b). To recognise this, it is said that certain possible
states are, in his subjective judgement, ‘equally likely’.
As always in physics, subjectivity is a source of trou-
ble. In case of the above ‘principle of indifference’ this
trouble is exacerbated by the fact that the objective clas-
sical state (e.g., of the deck of cards) is well defined and
does not respect ‘symmetries of the state of mind’ of the
observer.
Subjectivity was the principal reason this ‘standard
definition of probabilities’ has fallen out of favor, and
was largely replaced by the ‘relative frequency approach’
[18-20]. We shall not discuss it in detail as yet, but we
remind the reader that in this approach probability of a
certain event – i.e., a certain outcome – is given by its
relative frequency in an infinite ensemble.
There are problems with this strategy as well. My
discomfort with relative frequencies stems from the fact
that infinite ensembles generally do not exist, and, hence,
have to be imagined – i.e., must be subjectively extrapo-
lated from finite sets of data. So, subjectivity cannot be
convincingly exorcised in this manner.
I bring up relative frequencies here only to note that
the strategy of using swaps to define equiprobable events
would work also in this setting. When a swap (i.e., re-
labeling all sk as sl – e.g, renaming “heads” as “tails”
and vice versa) applied to an ensemble leaves all the rel-
ative frequencies of the swapped states unchanged, their
probabilities must have been equal. In a sense, this ob-
servation may be regarded as an independent motivation
of the assumption (a) above.
In quantum physics, exact symmetry of a composite
state – envariance – can be used to demonstrate that
the observer need not care about swapping, as envariant
swapping provably cannot alter anything in his part of
the bipartite system when ψSE is ‘even’ – that is, of the
form given by Eq. (5). We illustrate it in Fig. 1c. As we
have already seen, envariance makes ignorance and prob-
abilities easier to define. The circularity of the ‘standard
definition’ is easier to circumvent in the quantum set-
ting. It is however important to understand what fixes
this ‘menu of options’, and to find out when they can be
9a)
b)
c)
+| >S| >E | >S| >E
+| >S| >E | >S| >E
+| >S| >E | >S| >E
+| >S| >E | >S| >E
+| >S| >E | >S| >E=
~
=
FIG. 1: Envariance is related to the ‘principle of indifference’ (or the ‘principle of equal likelihood’) used by Laplace [17] to
define subjective probabilities. However in quantum physics envariance leads to probabilities based on an objective symmetries
of the underlying physical state of the system. The principle of indifference is illustrated in Fig. 1a. An observer (or a card
player) who knows one of the two cards is ♠ but does not see their faces does not care – is indifferent – when cards get swapped
(even when he needs ♠ to win). When the probability of a favorable outcome is the same before and after the swap then the
states are equivalent (“≈”) from his point of view. This leads to subjective probabilities given by the ratio of the number of
favorable outcomes to the total; p♠ =
1
2
. Laplace’s approach based on observers ignorance and not on the actual physical
state is often regarded as the sole justification of Bayesian view. It is controversial. In particular, it does not reflect the actual
‘physical’ state of the system: As seen in Fig. 1b, states before and after the swap are not equivalent, “6=”. Fig 1c shows how
quantum theory leads to probabilities based on the physical state when the system of interest when S is entangled with ‘the
environment’ E . Such entanglement would occur as a result of decoherence. When S and E are maximally entangled, the swap
on S has no effect on its state. This is clear, since its effect can be undone without acting on S – by a ‘counterswap’ that
involves only E . The final states are simply the same, so the probability of the swapped states of S must also be the same!
Envariance can be used to prove (see Theorem 2) that for such ‘even’ entangled states that have the same absolute values of the
coefficients (which makes them envariantly swappable), probabilities of mutually exclusive alternatives (orthonormal Schmidt
states) are equal. Generalization of to the case of unequal coefficients is straightforward and establishes Born’s rule pk = |ψk|
2.
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regarded as effectively classical.
B. Quantum and classical ignorance
Motivating the need for probabilities using ignorance
about a preexisting state is often regarded as synony-
mous with the ignorance interpretation. We have relied
on a similar approach. However, for our purpose a nar-
rowly classical definition of ignorance through an appeal
to definite classical possibilities one of which actually ex-
ists independently of observer and can be discovered by
his measurements without being perturbed is simply too
restrictive: Observer can be ignorant of the outcome of
his future measurement also when the system in ques-
tion is quantum and when there are no fixed pre-existing
alternatives. He can then choose between various non-
commuting observables and sets of alternative ‘events’
defined by their complementary eigenstates. That choice
of what to measure determines what is it observer is ig-
norant about – what sort of information his about-to-be-
performed measurement will reveal.
Quantum definition of probabilities based on envari-
ance is superior to the above mentioned classical ap-
proaches because it justifies ignorance objectively, with-
out appealing to observers’ subjective ‘lack of knowl-
edge’. Entangled quantum state of SE (or any pair of
entangled systems) can be perfectly known to the ob-
server beforehand. There can be multiple records of that
state spread throughout the environment, making it ‘op-
erationally objective’ – simultaneously accessible to many
observers. They can use its objective global properties to
demonstrate – employing real swaps one can carry out in
the laboratory – that the outcomes of some of the mea-
surements one can perform are provably swappable, and,
hence, equiprobable. In this sense, observers can directly
measure probabilities of various outcomes without having
to find out first what these outcomes are.
Note that this can be accomplished without an appeal
to an “ensemble”, “likelihood”, or any other surrogate
for probability: All that is needed is a single system S,
as well as appropriate E and C. The entangled states we
have studied in the preceding section can be then created,
and their symmetries can be verified through manipula-
tions and measurements. Moreover, the measurements
involved have outcomes that can be predicted with cer-
tainty. This is how the concept of probability enters our
discussion. Observer is certain of the global state, and
(using envariance) can count the number of envariantly
swappable (and, hence, equiprobable) outcomes.
The aim of the observer is to use records of the out-
comes of past measurements (his data) that in effect de-
fine the global state to predict future events – his future
record of the measurement of the local system. Tools that
can be legally employed in this task include observers
knowledge of the ‘no collapse’ quantum physics, encap-
sulated in the opening paragraph of Section II, as well
as the facts 1-3 of the preceding section. They do not
include Born’s rule: Hence the trace operation, reduced
density matrices, etc. are ‘off limits’ in our derivations
(although when we succeed, embargo on their use will be
lifted).
In the no-collapse settings, effective classicality of the
memory can be justified through appeal to decoherence
[3-8,15]. But here we cannot appeal to full-fledged de-
coherence, cannot rely on trace, etc. Is there still a way
to recover enough of the ‘effectively classical’ to justify
existence of classical records we took for granted in the
preceding section?
C. Problems of ‘no collapse’ approaches
There were several attempts to make sense of prob-
abilities in the ‘no collapse’ setting [21-25]. They have
relied almost exclusively on relative frequencies (count-
ing probabilities) [21-23]. The aim was to show that, in
the limit of infinitely many measurements, only branches
in which relative frequency definition would have given
the answer for probabilities consistent with Born’s rule
have a non-vanishing measure. However, that meant dis-
missing infinitely many (‘maverick’) branches where this
is not the case, because their amplitude becomes negligi-
ble in the same infinite limit. All of these attempts have
been shown to use circular arguments [25-29]: In effect,
they were all forced to assume that relative weights of the
branches are based on their amplitudes. That meant that
another measure was introduced, without physical justi-
fication, in order to legitimize use of relative frequency
measure based on counting.
By contrast, derivations of Born’s rule that assume
‘collapse’ either explicitly [30,32] or implicitly [31], that
is by considering ab initio infinite ensembles of identi-
cal systems so that ‘branches’ with ‘wrong’ relative fre-
quency of counts simply disappear as their amplitudes
vanish in the infinite ensemble limit have been successful
(although see [33] for a somewhat more critical assess-
ment of Refs. [31,32]).
Indeed, Gleason’s theorem [30] is now an accepted and
rightly famous part of quantum foundations. It is rigor-
ous – it is after all a theorem about measures on Hilbert
spaces. However, regarded as a result in physics it is
deeply unsatisfying: it provides no insight into physi-
cal significance of quantum probabilities – it is not clear
why the observer should assign probabilities in accord
with the measure indicated by Gleason’s approach [22-
29,31-34]. This has motivated various primarily frequen-
tist approaches [22-29,,31,32,34]. However, as was al-
ready noted in the discussion of the relative frequency
approach, appeal to infinite ensembles is highly suspect,
especially when – as is the case here – the desired ef-
fect is achieved only when the size of ensemble N = ∞
[27-29,33].
In view of these difficulties, some have even expressed
doubts as to whether there is any room for the concept of
probability in the no-collapse setting [26-29]. This con-
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cern is on occasion traced all the way to the identity of the
observer who could define and make use of probabilities
in Many Worlds universe. Such criticism was often am-
plified by pointing out that, in the pre-decoherence ver-
sions of Everett - inspired interpretations, decomposition
of the universal state vector is not unique (see e.g. com-
ments in Ref. [27]) so it is not even clear what ‘events’
should such probabilities refer to. This difficulty was re-
garded by some as so severe that even staunch supporters
of Everett considered adding an ad hoc rule to quantum
theory to specify a preferred basis (see e.g. Ref. [35]) in
clear violation of the spirit of the original relative state
proposal [12].
Basis ambiguity was settled by einselection [3-9,14,15].
But standard tools of decoherence are ‘off limits’ here.
And even if we were to accept decoherence - based res-
olution of basis ambiguity and used einselected pointer
states to define branches, we would be still faced with
at least one remaining aspect of the ‘identity crisis’: In
course of a measurement the memory of the observer
‘branches out’ so that it appears to record (and, hence,
critics conclude, observer should presumably perceive) all
of the outcomes. If that were so, then there would be no
room for distinct outcomes, choice, and hence, no need
for probabilities.
Existential interpretation is based on einselection
[3,8,15] and can settle also this aspect of the identity cri-
sis. It follows physical state of the observer by tracking
its evolution, also in course of measurements. Complete
description of observers’ state includes physical state of
his memory, which is updated as he acquires new records.
So, what the observer knows is inseparable from what the
observer is. Observer who has acquired new data does
not lose his identity: He simply extends his records – his
history. Identity of the observer as well as his ability to
measure persist as long as such updates do not result in
too drastic a change of that state (see Wallace [36] for
a related point of view). For instance, Wigner’s friend
would be able to continue to act as observer with reliable
memory in each ‘outcome branch’, but the same cannot
be said about the Schro¨dinger’s cat.
But the existential interpretation depends on decoher-
ence. Threfore, we have to either disown it altogether
while embarking on the derivation of Born’s rule, or re-
establish its foundations without relying on trace and
reduced density matrices to derive Born’s rule. Once we
are successfull, we can then proceed to reconstruct all of
the “standard lore” of decoherence, including all of its
interpretational implications, on a firm and deep founda-
tion – quantum symmetry of entangled states.
We note that when (at the risk of circularity we have
detailed above) decoherence is assumed, Born’s rule can
be readily derived using variety of approaches [8,24] in-
cluding versions of both standard and frequentist points
of view [8] as well as approaches based on decision the-
ory [24,36] suggested by Deutsch and Wallace. I shall
comment on these in Section VII.
IV. POINTER STATES, RECORDS, AND
‘EVENTS’
Probability is a tool observers employ in the absence
of certainty to predict their future (including in particu-
lar future state of their own memory) using the already
available data – present state of their memory. Some-
times these data can determine some of the future events
uniquely. However, often predictions will be probabilistic
– the observer may count on one of the potential out-
comes, but will not know which one. Our task is to re-
place questions that uncertain outcomes of future mea-
surement on the system with situations that allow for a
certainty of prediction about the effect of some actions
(swaps) on an enlarged system. In that sense we are
reducing questions about probabilities in general to the
straightforward case – to the questions that yield answers
with certainty (i.e., with probability of 1). This special
case makes the connection with probability in the situa-
tion when probability is known. It provides us with the
overall normalization. Using this connection, we then
infer probabilities of possible outcomes of measurements
on S from the analogue of the Laplacean ‘ratio of favor-
able events to the total number of equiprobable events’,
which we shall see in Section V is a good definition of
quantum probabilities for events associated with effec-
tively classical records kept in pointer states. In quantum
physics this ratio can be determined using envariance and
even verified experimentally prior to finding out what the
event is. But we do need events. Hence, we need pointer
states.
In classical physics it can be always assumed that a
random event was pre-determined – i.e., that the to-be-
discovered state existed objectively beforehand and was
only revealed by the measurement. Indeed, such objec-
tive preexistence is often regarded as a pre-condition of
the ‘ignorance interpretation’ of probabilities. In quan-
tum physics, as John Archibald Wheeler put it para-
phrasing Niels Bohr, “No phenomenon is a phenomenon
untill it is a recorded phenomenon” [37]. Objective exis-
tence cannot be attributed to quantum states of isolated,
individual systems. When the system is being monitored
by the environment, one may approximate objective ex-
istence by selectively proliferating quantum information
(this is the essence of quantum Darwinism). Operational
definition of objectivity – one of the key symptoms of
classicality – can be recovered using this idea, as selec-
tive proliferation leads to many copies of the information
about the same ‘fittest’ observable.
Here we deal with individual quantum events – out-
comes of future measurements on individual quantum
systems, not carried out as yet. They need not (and,
in general, do not) preexist even in the sense of quantum
Darwinism – selective proliferation of information has not
happened as yet. The observer will decide what observ-
able he will measure (and, hence, what information will
get proliferated, and become effectively classical). The
menu of events should be determined by the observable
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he chooses to measure.
Objective pre-existence of events is not needed before
the measurement. On the other hand, as noted above,
we need some aspects of classicality to represent mem-
ory of the observer after the measurement. Objectivity
would be best, but we can settle for less: The key ingredi-
ent is the existence of well-defined ‘events’ – record states
that, following measurement, will reliably preserve corre-
lation with the recorded state of the system in spite of the
immersion of the memory in the environment. Pointer
states [5-9] are called for, but we are not allowed to use
decoherence.
There are at least three reasons why preferred states
(that are stable in spite of the opennes of the system)
are essential. The original reason for their introduction
[5] was to assure that observers’ memory is effectively
classical – einselection of preferred basis ascertains that
his ‘hardware’ can keep records only in the pointer basis.
It follows that model observers will store and process
information more or less like us (and more or less like
a classical computer). For instance, human brain is a
massivelly parallel, and as yet far from understood, but
nevertheless classical information processing device. And
classical records cannot exist (cannot be accessed) in su-
perpositions.
A more pertinent reason to look for preferred states is
the recognition that the information processing hardware
of observers is open – immersed in the environment. In-
teraction with E is a fact of life. Unless we find in the
memory Hilbert space ‘quiet corners’ that remain quiet
in spite of this openness, reliable memory (and hence re-
liable information processing) will not be possible.
Last not least, the very idea of measuring makes sense
only if measurement outcomes can be used for predic-
tion. But most of the systems of interest are ‘open’ as
well. Therefore, predictability can be hoped for only in
special cases – for the einselected pointer states of sys-
tems that can remain correlated with the apparatus that
has measured them [5,6,8].
Decoherence methods used to analyse consequences of
such immersion in the environment employ reduced den-
sity matrices and trace [3-9,14,15]. They are based on
Born’s rule. Once decoherence is assumed, Born’s rule
can be readily derived [8], but this strategy courts circu-
larity [3,38]. Obviously, if we temporarily renounce de-
coherence (so that we can attempt to derive pk = |ψk|2)
we have to find some other way to either justify exis-
tence of pointer states and the einselection - based defini-
tion of branches in a decoherence - independent manner,
or give up and conclude that while Born’s rule is con-
sistent with decoherence, it cannot be established from
more basic principles in a no-collapse setting. We shall
show that, fortunately, preferred states do obtain more
or less directly from envariance. That is, environment
- induced superselection, and, hence, pointer basis and
branches can be defined by analysing correlations be-
tween quantum systems, very much in the spirit of the
original ‘pointer basis’ proposal [5], and without the dan-
ger of circularity that may have arisen from reliance on
trace and reduced density matrices.
A. Relative states and definite outcomes:
Modeling the collapse
The essence of the ‘no collapse’ approach is its relative
state nature – its focus on correlations. Once we identify
possible record states of the memory, the correlation be-
tween them and the states of the relevant fragments of
the Universe is all that matters: Observer will be ‘aware’
of what he knows, and all he knows is represented by
his data. The key is, however to identify relative pointer
states that are suitable as memory states.
We start our discussion with a confirmatory pre-
measurement in which there is no need for the full-fledged
‘collapse’. Observer is presented with a system in a state
ϕ, and told to measure observable that has ϕ as one
of its eigenstates. He need not know the outcome be-
forehand. Given a set of potential mutually exclusive
outcomes {. . . , ϕ, . . .} observer can devise an interaction
that will – with certainty – lead to:
|A0〉⊗N |ϕ〉 {...ϕ...}−→ |A0〉⊗N−1|Aϕ〉|ϕ〉 . (11a)
Above, ‘ready to record’ memory cells are designated by
|A0〉, and the symbol above the arrow representing mea-
surement indicates that the set of possible outcomes in-
cludes ϕ. This pre-measurement can be repeated many
(m) times:
|A0〉⊗N |ϕ〉 {...ϕ...}−→ . . . −→︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
|A0〉⊗N−m|Aϕ〉⊗m|ϕ〉 . (11b)
Each new outcome can be predicted by the observer from
the first record providing that – as we assume here and
below – there is no evolution between measurements and
that the measured observable does not change.
In spite of the concerns we have reported before there
is no threat to the identity of the observer. Moreover, in
view of the recorded evidence, Eq. (11b), and his abil-
ity to predict future outcomes in this situation, observer
may assert that the system is in the state ϕ. Indeed,
if we did not assume that our observer is familiar with
quantum physics, we could try and convince him that –
in view of the evidence – the system must have been in
the preexisting ‘objective state’ ϕ already before the first
measurement. This happens to be the case in our exam-
ple, but the state of a single system is not ‘objective’ in
the same absolute sense one may take for granted in the
classical realm: Obviously, in quantum theory a long se-
quence of records after the measurement is no guarantee
of the ‘objective preexistence’ of the observer - indepen-
dent state before the measurement in the same sense as
was the case in the classical realm.
When the observer subsequently decides to measure a
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different observable with the eigenstates {|sk〉} such that:
|ϕ〉 =
N∑
k=1
〈sk|ϕ〉|sk〉 (12a)
the overall state viewed ‘from the outside’ will become:
|A0〉⊗N−m|Aϕ〉⊗m|ϕ〉
{|sk〉}−→ |A0〉⊗N−m−1|Aϕ〉⊗m
N∑
k=1
〈sk|ϕ〉|Ak〉|sk〉 . (13a)
It is tempting to regard each sequence of records as a
‘branch’ of the above state vector. It certainly represents
a possible state of the observer with the data concerning
his ‘history’, including records of the state of the system.
From his point of view, observer can therefore describe
this ‘personal’ recorded history as follows: ‘As long as
I was measuring observables with the eigenstate ϕ, the
outcome was certain – it was always the same. After
the first measurement, there was no surprise. In that
operational sense the system was in the state |ϕ〉. When I
switched to measuring {|sk〉}, the outcome became (say)
|s17〉, and the system was in that state thereafter.’ This
conclusion follows from his records:
. . . |Aϕ〉⊗m|ϕ〉 {|sk〉}−→ . . . |Aϕ〉⊗m|A17〉|s17〉
{|sk〉}−→ . . . −→︸ ︷︷ ︸
l−1
. . . |Aϕ〉⊗m|A17〉⊗l|s17〉 . (13b)
There will be, of course, N such branches,
each of them labeled by a specific record (e.g.,
. . . |A16〉⊗l, |A17〉⊗l, |A18〉⊗l . . .). But, especially when
records are well - defined and stable, then there is again
no threat to the identity of the observer. (Also note
that in the equation above we have stopped counting the
“still available” empty memory cells. In the tradition
that dates back to Turing we shall assume, from now
on, that observer has enough ‘blank memory’ to record
whatever needs to be recorded.)
Now come the two key lessons of this section: To
‘first approximation’, from the point of view of the ev-
idence (i.e., records in observer possession) there is no
difference between the ‘classical collapse’ of many future
possibilities into one present actuality he experiences af-
ter his first ‘confirmatory’ measurement, Eq. (11), and
the ‘quantum collapse’, Eq. (13). Before the confirma-
tory measurement observer was told what observable he
should measure, and he found out the state ϕ. A very
similar thing happened when the observer switched to
the different observable with the eigenstates {|sk〉}: Af-
ter the first measurement with an uncertain outcome a
predictable sequence of confirmations followed.
In the ‘second approximation’, there is however an es-
sential difference: In case of the classical collapse, Eq.
(11), the observer had less of an idea about what to ex-
pect than in the case of genuine quantum measurement,
Eq. (13). This is because now – in contrast to the “er-
satz collapse” of Eq. (11) – observer knows all that can
be known about the system he is measuring. Thus, in
case of Eq. (11), observer did not know what to expect:
He had no certifiably accurate information that would
have allowed him to gauge what will happen. He could
have been left completely in the dark by the preparer (in
which case he might have been swayed by the arguments
of Laplace [17] and to assign equal probabilities to all
conceivable outcomes), or might have been persuaded to
accept some other Bayesian priors, or could have been
even deliberately misled. Thus, in the classical case of
Eq. (11) the observer has no reliable source of informa-
tion – no way of knowing what he actually does not know
– and, hence, no a priori way of assigning probabilities.
By contrast, in the quantum case of Eq. (13) observer
knows all that can be known. Therefore, he knows as
much as can be known about the system – he is in an
excellent position to deduce the chances of different con-
ceivable outcomes of the new measurement he is about
to perform.
This is the second lesson of our discussion, and an im-
portant conclusion: In quantum physics, ignorance can
be quantified more reliably than in the classical realm.
Remarkably, while the criticisms about assigning proba-
bilities ‘on the basis of ignorance’ have been made before
in the classical context of Eq. (11), perfect knowledge
available in the quantum case was often regarded as an
impediment.
B. Environment - induced superselection without
decoherence
We shall return to the discussion of probabilities
shortly. However, first we need to deal with the pre-
ferred basis problem pointed out above. The prediction
observer is trying to make – the only prediction he can
ultimately hope to verify – concerns the future state of
his memory A. We need to identify – without appeals
to full-fledged decoherence – which memory states are
suitable for keeping records, and, more generally, which
states in the rest of the Universe are sufficiently stable to
be worth recording. The criterion: such states should be
sufficiently well behaved so that the correlation between
observers records and the measured systems should have
predictive power [5]. Predictability shall remain our key
concern (as was the case in the studies employing de-
coherence [3-9,14,15,39]) although now we shall have to
formulate a somewhat different – ‘decoherence - free’ –
approach.
The issue we obviously need to address is the basis am-
biguity: Why is it more reasonable to consider a certain
set {|Ak〉} as memory states rather than some other set
{|Bk〉} that spans the same (memory cell or pointer state)
Hilbert space? One answer is that observer presumably
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tested his memory before, so that the initial state of his
record - bearing memory cells as well as the interaction
Hamiltonian used to measure – to generate conditional
dynamics – have the structure that implements the ‘truth
table’ of the form:
|A0〉|sk〉 −→ |Ak〉|sk〉 . (14)
But this is not a very convincing or fundamental reso-
lution of the broader problem of the emergence of the
preferred set of effectively classical (predictable) states
from within the Hilbert space. Clearly, the state on the
RHS of Eq. (13a) is entangled. So one could consult A
in any basis {|Bl〉} and discover the corresponding state
of S:
|rl〉 =
N∑
k=1
〈Bl|Ak〉〈sk|ϕ〉|sk〉 . (15)
The question is: Why should the observer remember his
past, think of his future and perceive his present state in
terms of {|Ak〉}’s rather than {|Bl〉}’s? Future measure-
ments of one of the states {|rl〉} (which form in general
a non-orthogonal, but typically complete set within the
subspace spanned by {|sk〉}) could certainly be devised
so that the outcome confirms the initial result. Why then
did we write down the chain of equations (13b) using one
specific set of states (and anticipating the corresponding
set of effectively classical correlations)?
1. Pointer states from envariance: The case of perfect
correlation
Basis ambiguity is usually settled by an appeal to de-
coherence. That is, after the pre-measurement – after
the memory A of the apparatus or of the observer be-
comes entangled with the system – A interacts with the
environment E , so that E in effect pre-measures A:
|A0〉|ϕ〉|ε0〉 {|sk〉}−→
( N∑
k=1
〈sk|ϕ〉|Ak〉|sk〉
)|ε0〉
{|εk〉}−→
N∑
k=1
〈sk|ϕ〉|Ak〉|sk〉|εk〉 = |ΨSAE〉 . (16)
The observable left unperturbed by the interaction with
the environment should be the ‘record observable’ of A.
Then the preferred pointer states {|Ak〉} are einselected.
Note that this very same combined state would have
resulted if the environment interacted with S and ‘mea-
sured it’ directly in the basis {|sk〉}, before the correlation
of A and S. Clearly, there is more than one way to “skin
the Schro¨dinger cat”. This remark is meant to motivate
and justify a simplification of notation later on in the dis-
cussion. In reality, it is likely that both A and S would
have interacted with their environments, and that each
might be immersed in (one or more) physically distinct
E ’s. Recognising this in notation is cumbersome, and has
no bearing on our immediate goal of showing that eins-
election of pointer states can be justified without taking
a trace to compute the reduced density matrix.
In the situation when the measured observable is her-
mitean (so that its eigenstates are orthogonal) and envi-
ronment pre-measures the memory in the record states,
Eq. (16) has the most general form possible. It is there-
fore enough to focus on a single E , and reserve the right
to entangle it sometimes with A and sometimes with S,
and sometimes with both.
Given that the measured observable is hermitean and
recognising the nature of the conditional dynamics of the
AE interaction, the resulting density matrix would have
the form:
ρSA = TrE |ΨSAE〉〈ΨSAE | =
N∑
k=1
|〈sk|ϕ〉|2 |Ak〉|sk〉〈sk|〈Ak| .
(17)
Preservation of the perfect correlation between S and A
in the preferred set of pointer states of A is a hallmark of
a successfull measurement. Entanglement is eliminated
by decoherence, (e.g. discord disappears [41]) but one-
to-one classical correlation with the einselected states re-
mains. This singles out {|Ak〉}’s as ‘buds’ of the new
branches that can be predictably extended by subsequent
measurements of the same observable, e.g.;
. . . |A17〉|s17〉|ε17〉 {|sk〉}−→ . . . −→︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
. . . |A17〉⊗l|s17〉|ε17〉⊗l .
The trace in Eq. (17) that yields density matrix is how-
ever ‘illegal’ in the discussion aimed at the derivation of
Born’s rule: Both the physical interpretation of the trace
and of the reduced density matrix are justified assum-
ing Born’s rule. So we need to look for a different, more
fundamental justification of the preferred set of pointer
states.
Fortunately, envariance alone hints at the existence of
the preferred states: As Theorem 1 demonstrates, phases
of Schmidt coefficients have no relevance for the states
of entangled systems. In that sense, superpositions of
Schmidt states for the system S or for the apparatus A
that are entangled with some E do not exist either. Now,
this corollary of Theorem 1 comes close to answering the
original pointer basis question [5]: When measurement
happens, into what basis does the wavepacket collapse?
Obviously, if we disqualify all superpositions of some pre-
ferred set of states, only these preferred states will remain
viable. This is an envariant version of the account of the
negative selection process, the predictability sieve that is
usually introduced using full-fledged decoherence. The
aim of this section is to refine this envariant view of the
emergence of preferred basis [2,3] by investigating sta-
bility and predictive utility of the correlations between
candidate record states of the apparatus and the corre-
sponding state of the system.
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The ability to infer the state of the system from the
state of the apparatus is now very much dependent on the
selection of the measurement of A. Thus, the preferred
basis {|Ak〉} yields one-to-one correlations between A and
S that do not depend on E ;
|Ak〉〈Ak||ΨSAE〉 ∝ |Ak〉|sk〉|εk〉 . (18a)
Above, we have written out explicitely just the relevant
part of the resulting state – i.e., the part that is selected
by the projection.
By contrast, if we were to rely on any other basis,
the information obtained would have to do not just with
the system, but with a joint state of the system and the
environment. For instance, measurement in the comple-
mentary basis:
|Bl〉 =
N∑
k=1
ei2pikl/N√
N
|Ak〉
would result in rather messy entangled state of S and E :
|Bl〉〈Bl||ΨSAE〉 ∝ |Bl〉
( N∑
k=1
e−i2pikl/N√
N
ak|sk〉|εk〉
)
.
(18b)
This correlation with entangled SE state obviously pre-
vents one from inferring the state of the system of interest
S alone from memory states in the basis {|Bl〉}: Bases
other than pointer states {|Ak〉} do not correlate solely
with S, but with entangled (or, more generally, mixed
but correlated) states of SE .
We conclude that the pointer states ofA can be defined
in the “old fashioned way” – as states best at preserving
correlation with S, and nothing but S. This perfect cor-
relation will persist even when, say, the environment is
initially in a mixed state. Our decoherence - free defi-
nition of preferred states appeals to the same intuition
as the original argument in [5], or as the predictability
sieve [15,39,3,8,9], but does not require reduced density
matrices or other ingredients that rely on Born’s rule.
2. Pointer states from envariance: Einselection, records,
and dynamics
The example of einselection considered above allowed
us to recover pointer states under very strong assump-
tions, i.e., when {|sk〉}, {|Ak〉} and {|εk〉} are all or-
thonormal. But such tripartite Schmidt decompositions
are an exception [40]. It is therefore important to in-
vestigate whether our conclusions remain valid when we
look at a more realistic case of an apparatus that first en-
tangles with S through pre-measurement and thereafter
continues to interact with E . The SA interaction may be
brief, and can be represented by Hamiltonians that in-
duce conditional dynamics summed up in the truth table
of Eq. (14). The effect of immersion of the apparatus
pointer or the memory cell in the environment is often
modelled by an on-going interaction generated by the
Hamiltonian with the structure:
HAE =
∑
k,ν
gkν |Ak〉〈Ak| ⊗ |eν〉〈eν | (19a)
which leads to a time-dependent state:
|ΨSAE〉 =
∑
k
ak|sk〉|Ak〉
∑
ν
γνe
−igkνt|eν〉
=
∑
k
ak|sk〉|Ak〉|εk(t)〉 . (19b)
The decoherence factor:
ζkk′ = 〈εk|εk′〉 =
∑
ν
|γν |2ei(gk′ν−gkν)t (19c)
responsible for suppressing off-diagonal terms in the re-
duced density matrix ρSA is generally non-vanishing al-
though, for sufficiently large t and large environments, it
is typically vanishingly small. Of course, as yet – i.e., in
the absence of Born’s rule – we have no right to attribute
any physical significance to its value.
In the above tripartite state only {|Ak〉} are by as-
sumption orthonormal. We need not assert that about
{|sk〉} – the initial truth table might have been, after
all, imperfect, or the measured observable may not be
hermitean. Still, even in this case with relaxed assump-
tions perfect correlation of the states of the system with
the fixed set of records – pointer states {|Ak〉} – persists,
as the reader can verify by repeating calculations of Eq.
(18).
The decomposition of Eq. (19b) is typically not
Schmidt when we regard SAE as bipartite, consisting
of SA and E – product states |Ak〉|sk〉 are orthonormal,
but the scalar products of the associated states |εk(t)〉
are given by the decoherence factor ζkk′ (t), which is gen-
erally different from zero. The key conclusion can be now
summed up with:
Theorem 3: When the environment-apparatus interac-
tion has the form of Eq. (19a), only the pointer observ-
able of A can maintain perfect correlation with the states
of the measured system independently of the initial state
of E and time t.
Proof: From Eq. (19b) it is clear that states |Ak〉 main-
tain perfect 1-1 correlation with the states |sk〉 at all
times, and for all initial states of E – i.e., independetly of
the coefficients γk. This establishes that |Ak〉 are good
pointer states.
To complete the proof, we still need to establish the
converse, i.e., that these are the only such good record
states. To this end, consider another set of candidate
memory states of A:
|Bl〉 =
∑
k
blk|Ak〉 .
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The corresponding conditional state of the rest of SAE
is of the form:
|Bl〉〈Bl|ΨSAE〉 ∝ |Bl〉
∑
k
akblk|sk〉|εk(t)〉 . (19d)
It is clearly an entangled state of SE unless all k, k′ that
appear with non-zero coefficients differ only by a phase.
That condition implies that 〈εk(t)|εk′ (t)〉 = exp(iφkk′ ),
that is, |ζkk′ (t)| = 1. This would in turn mean that the
environment has not become correlated with the states
|Ak〉.
In general |ζkk′ (t)| < 1. Thus, states of SE corre-
lated with the basis |Bl〉 of the apparatus are entangled
– records contained in that basis do not reveal informa-
tion about the system alone (as records in the basis |Ak〉
do), but, rather, about ill-defined entangled states of the
system of interest S and environment E (which is of no
interest). Thus, as stated in the thesis of this theorem,
the only way to assure 1-1 record - outcome correlation
for all t independently of the initial state of E is to use
pointer states |Ak〉. QED.
Remark: The above argument sheds an interesting new
light on the nature of the environment - induced loss of
information. In case of imperfections the state corre-
lated with records kept in the memory has the form of
Eq. (19d) – that is, it can be a pure entangled state of
SE , and not the state of S alone. Observer still knows
exactly the state, but it is a state of a wrong system! In-
stead of the “system on interest” S, it is a composite SE .
Consequently, (i) even if the observer knew the initial
state of E , the state of the system of interest S cannot be
immediately deduced. Moreover, (ii) typically the initial
state of E is not known, which makes the state of S even
more difficult to find out.
We have provided a definition of pointer states by ex-
amining the structure of correlations in the pure states
involving S,A and E . It is straightforward to extend this
argument to the more typical case when E is initially in
a mixed state (for example, by “purifying” E in the usual
manner). So, all of our discussion can be based on pure
states and projections – preferred pointer states emerge
without invoking trace or reduced density matrices.
In spite of the more basic approach, our motivation
has remained the same: Preservation of the classical (or
at least “one way classical” [41]) correlations, i.e., corre-
lations between the preferred orthonormal set of pointer
states of the apparatus and of the (possibly more general)
states of the system that can be accessed (by measuring
pointer observable of A) without further loss of informa-
tion. Therefore, it is perhaps not too surprising that the
preferred pointer observable
Λ =
∑
k
λk|Ak〉〈Ak|
commutes with the AE interaction Hamiltonian, Eq.
(19a), responsible for decoherence:
[Λ, HAE ] = 0 . (20)
This simple equation valid under special circumstances
was derived in the paper that has introduced the idea of
pointer states in the context of quantum measurements
[5], starting from the same condition of the preservation
of correlations we have invoked here.
Pointer states coincide with Schmidt states in the tri-
partite SAE when a perfect premeasurement of a her-
mitean observable is followed by perfect decoherence,
that is when ζkk′ = 0. This case was noted and its more
general consequences were anticipated by brief comments
about pointer states emerging from envariance in [2,3].
We also note that the recorded states of S do not need
to be orthonormal for the above argument to go through.
We have relied on the orthogonality of the record states
{|Ak〉} and invoked some of its consequences without
having to assume idealized perfect measurements of her-
mitean observables. We note that this strategy can be
used to attribute probabilities to non-orthogonal (i.e.,
overcomplete) basis states of S, as long as they even-
tually correlate with orthonormal record states.
The ability to recover pointer states without appeal
to trace – and, hence, without an implicit appeal to
Born’s rule – is a pivotal consequence of envariance: We
have just shown that einselection can be deduced and
‘branches’ may emerge without relying on decoherence.
Rather than use trace and reduced density matrices we
have produced a derivation based solely on the ability of
an open system (in our case memory A) to maintain cor-
relations with the test system S in spite of the interaction
with the environment E .
In hindsight, this ability to find preferred basis with-
out reduced density matrices – although unanticipated
[29,38] – can be readily understood: Emergence of pre-
ferred states (which in the usual decoherence - based ap-
proach habitually appear on the diagonal of the reduced
density matrix) is a consequence of the disappearance of
the off-diagonal terms. But off-diagonal terms disappear
when states of the environment correlated with them are
orthonormal – when the decoherence factor defined by
the scalar product 〈εk|εl〉 disappears if k 6= l. So, as
long as we do not use trace to assign weights (proba-
bilities) to the remaining (diagonal) terms, we are not
invoking Born’s rule. In short, one can find out eigen-
states of the reduced density matrix without enquiring
about its eigenvalues, and especially without regarding
them as probabilities.
V. PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE RECORD
To arrive at Born’s rule within the ‘no-collapse’ point
of view we now follow envariant strategy of Section II, but
with one important difference: The probability refers ex-
plicitely to the possible future state of the observer. This
approach is very much in the spirit of the existential in-
terpretation which in turn builds on the idea (that was
most clearly stated by Everett [12]) to let quantum for-
malism dictate its interpretation.
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Existential interpretation is introduced more carefully
and discussed in detail elsewhere [15,8,3]. It combines
relative state point of view with the recognition of the
emergence and role of the preferred pointer states. In
essence, and in the context of the present discussion, ac-
cording to the existential interpretation observer will per-
ceive himself (or, to be more precise, his memory) in one
of the pointer states, and therefore attribute to the rest
of the Universe state consistent with his records. His
memory is immersed in the environment. His records
(stored in pointer states) are not secret. Indeed, because
of the persistent monitoring by the environment, many
copies of the information inscribed in his possession are
‘in public domain’ – in the environmental degrees of free-
dom: Hence, the content of his memory can be in prin-
ciple deduced (e.g., by many other observers, monitoring
independent fragments of the environment) from mea-
surements of the relevant fragments of the environment.
Selective proliferation of information about pointer ob-
servables – allows records to be in effect ‘relatively ob-
jective’ [3,8]. This operational notion of objectivity is
all that is needed for the ‘objective classical reality’ to
emerge. Obviously, observer will not be able to rede-
fine memory pointer states – correlations involving their
superpositions are useless for the purpose of prediction.
Existential interpretation is usually justified by an ap-
peal to decoherence, which limits the set of states that
can retain useful correlations to pointer states – states
that can persist, and therefore, exist – to a small subset
of all possible states in the memory Hilbert space. As
we have seen in the preceding section, the case for per-
sistence of the pointer states can be made by exploiting
nature – and, especially, persistence – of the SA correla-
tions established in course of the measurement in spite of
the subsequent interaction of with the environment. In
short, we can ask about the probability that the observer
will end up in a certain pointer state – that his memory
will contain the corresponding record, and the rest of the
Universe will be in a state consistent with these records
– without using trace operation or reduced density ma-
trices of full-fledged decoherence.
A. The case of equal probabilities
We begin with the case of equal probabilities. That is,
we consider:
|ϕ〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
eiφk |sk〉 , (12b)
and note that following pre-measurement and as a con-
sequence of the resulting entanglement with the environ-
ment we get:
|Ψ¯SAE〉 =
N∑
k=1
eiφk |sk〉|Ak〉|εk〉 =
N∑
k=1
eiφk |sk, Ak(sk)〉|εk〉 .
(21)
The notation on the RHS above is introduced temporar-
ily to emphasize that the essential unpredictability ob-
server is dealing with concerns his future state. As the
record states |Ak〉 are orthogonal, explicit recognition of
this focus of attention allows one to consider probabilities
of more general measurements where the outcome states
{|sk〉} of the system are not necessarily associated with
the orthonormal eigenstates of hermitean operators.
Orthogonality of states associated with events is
needed to appeal to envariance – we want events to be
‘mutually exclusive’. Now it can be provided by the
record states. Both measurements of non-hermitean ob-
servables as well as “destructive measurements” that do
not leave the system in the eigenstate of the measured
observable belong to this more general category. For in-
stance:
|ϕ¯〉|A0〉|ε0〉 ∝
( N∑
k=1
eiφk |sk〉
)|A0〉|ε0〉
−→ |s0〉
∑
k
|Ak(sk)〉|εk〉 (22)
is a possible idealized representation of a ‘destructive’
measurement such as a photodetection that leaves the
relevant mode of the field in the vacuum state |s0〉 but
allows the detector to record pre-measurement state of
S.
Most of our discussion below will be applicable to such
more general (and more realistic) measurements. How-
ever, the most convincing ‘existential’ evidence for the
‘collapse’ of the state of the system is provided by non-
demolition measurements. In that case repeating the
same measurement will yield the same outcome:
|Ψ¯SA⊗lE〉 =
N∑
k=1
eiφk |sk〉|Ak〉⊗l|εk〉⊗l . (23)
The observer will be led to conclude on the basis of his
record, (e.g. . . . |Aϕ〉⊗m|A17〉⊗l, Eq. (13b)) that a ‘col-
lapse’ of the state from the superposition of the poten-
tial outcomes (Eq. (12b)) into a specific actual outcome
(|s17〉) has ocurred. From his point of view, this clearly
is an unpredictable event.
The obvious question: “Given records of my previous
measurements |Aϕ〉⊗m, what are the chances that I, the
observer, will end up with a record |Ak〉⊗l of any specific
|sk〉?” can be now addressed. The same question can be
of course posed and answered in the more general case,
when the confirmation through the re-measurement of
the system is not possible, although then collapse is not
as well documented. Here we focus on non-demolition
measurements of hermitean operators to save on nota-
tion.
The motivation for considering |ψ¯SE〉 or |Ψ¯SAE〉 in-
stead of the pure initial state of the system in the study of
probabilities should be by now obvious: We have already
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noted in the course of the discussion of pointer states
that the anticipated and inevitable interaction with E
will lead from |ϕ¯〉 to |Ψ¯SAE〉, Eqs. (21)-(23). As all mea-
surements follow this general pattern, we can – without
any loss of generality – anticipate this decoherence - caus-
ing entanglement with E and start the analysis with the
appropriate state.
Observer can in principle carry out measurements of
S,A or E as well as global measurements of SAE that
will convince him of his ignorance of the states of indi-
vidual subsystems and allow him to assign probabilities
to different potential outcomes. The key measurement
in this strategy is the confirmation that the composite
systems of interest are returned to the initial pure state
(say, |ψSA〉 or |ΨSAE〉) after the appropriate swaps and
counterswaps are carried out. For example, a sequence
of operations:
|A0〉|ψ¯SE〉{...ψ¯SE ...}−→ |Aψ¯SE 〉|ψ¯SE〉 (24a)
uS(k ⇀↽ l)|ψ¯SE〉 = |η¯SE〉 (24b)
|A′0〉|η¯SE〉
{...η¯SE ...}−→ |A′η¯SE 〉|ψ¯SE 〉 (24c)
uE(k ⇀↽ l)|η¯SE〉 = |ψ¯SE〉 (24d)
|A′′0〉|ψ¯SE 〉
{...ψ¯SE ...}−→ |A′′¯ψSE 〉|ψ¯SE〉 (24e)
allows the observer to conclude that the even global state
|ψ¯SE〉 can be transformed by a swap in S into the state
|η¯SE〉, but that it can be restored to |ψ¯SE〉 by the appro-
priate counterswap in E . Observers familiar with quan-
tum theory and with the basic facts 1-3 concerning the
nature of systems that allowed us to establish Theorems
1 and 2 will be also convinced that probabilities of the
outcomes of the envariantly swappable states of S are
equal. Sequences of operations that can be carried out
as well as the perfect predictability of the records (e.g.,
. . . |Aψ¯SE 〉|A′¯ηSE 〉|A′′¯ψSE 〉 . . .) that always – that is, with
certainty – appear at the end of the experiments, will
convince the observer that each of the envariantly swap-
pable outcomes is equally likely – that each should be
assigned the same probability.
Note that, in principle, observer could treat one of his
own record cells as an external system. This happens
when the record is made by the memory of the apparatus,
and the observer is not yet aware of the outcome. Then
this record cell comes to play a role of the extension of the
system, i.e., its state can be swapped along with the state
of S it has recorded. There is little difference between this
set of measurements and swaps, and the sequence we have
just discussed, Eq. (24). The sequence involving memory
cell states (that are certifiably orthogonal) would allow
one to assign probabilities to the states of S that are not
orthogonal, as it was noted above.
B. Boolean algebra of records
We now implement the strategy outlined in Section II,
our ‘interpretation - neutral’ version of the derivation of
Born’s rule from envariance, but we shall use records as
‘events’. This will allow us to start at a more fundamen-
tal level than in section II. more. To begin with, we will
be able to establish wnat in section II was the additivity
assumption, Eq. (7b). We shall then go on to derive
Boolean logic (which is behind the calculus of probabil-
ities [20]), and re-derive Born’s rule from this ‘logical’
point of view.
1. Additivity of probabilities from envariance
In the axiomatic formulation of the probability theory
due to Kolmogorov (see, e.g., Ref. [20]) as well as in
the proof of Born’s rule due to Gleason [30] additivity is
an assumption motivated by the mathematical demand
– probability is a measure. On the other hand, in the
standard approach of Laplace [17] additivity can be es-
tablished starting from the definition of probability of
a composite event as a ratio of the number of favorable
equiprobable events to the total. The key ingredient that
makes this derivation of additivity possible is equiproba-
bility: We have an independent proof that there exists a
set of elementary events that are swappable, and, hence,
have the same probability.
Envariance under swaps is such an independent crite-
rion. Using it we can establish objectively (in contrast to
Laplace, who had to rely on the subjective ‘state of mind’
of the observer) that certain events are equiprobable. We
can then follow Laplace’s strategy and use equiprobabil-
ity to prove additivity. This is important, as additivity
of probabilities should not be automatically and uncriti-
cally adopted in the quantum setting. After all, quantum
theory is based on the principle of superposition – the
principle of additivity of complex amplitides – which is
prima facie incompatible with additivity of probabilities,
as is illustrated by the double slit experiment.
Phases between the record (pointer) states (or, more
generally, between any set of Schmidt states) do not in-
fluence outcome of any measurement that can be carried
out on the apparatus (or memory), as Theorem 1 and
our discussion in Section IV demonstrate. This indepen-
dence of the local state from global phases invalidates
the principle of superposition – the system of interest (or
the pointer of the apparatus, or the memory of the ob-
server) are ‘open’ – entangled with the environment. As a
consequence, we can, in effect, starting from envariance,
establish (rather than postulate) Laplacean formula for
the probability of a composite event:
Lemma 5: Probability of a composite (coarse-grained)
event consisting of a subset
κ ≡ {k1 ∨ k2 ∨ . . . ∨ knκ} (25)
of nκ of the total N envariantly swappable mutually
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exclusive exhaustive fine-grained events associated with
records corresponding to pointer states of the global
state, Eq. (21); |Ψ¯SAE〉 =
∑N
k=1 e
iφk |sk〉|Ak〉|εk〉 =∑N
k=1 e
iφk |sk, Ak(sk)〉|εk〉, is given by:
p(κ) =
nκ
N
. (26)
To prove additivity of probabilities using envariance
we consider the state:
|ΥA¯ASE 〉 ∝
∑
κ
|A¯κ〉
∑
k∈κ
|Ak〉|sk〉|εk〉 (27)
representing both the fine-grained and coarse-grained
records. We first note that the form of |ΥA¯ASE〉 justifies
assigning zero probability to |sj〉’s that do not appear –
i.e., appear with zero amplitude – in the initial state of
the system. Quite simply, there is no state of the observer
with a record of such zero-amplitude Schmidt states of
the system in |ΥA¯ASE〉, Eq. (27).
To establish Lemma 5 we shall further accept basic
implications of envariance: When there are total N en-
variantly swappable outcome states, and they exhaust all
of the possible outcomes, each should be assigned prob-
ability of 1/N , in accord with Eq. (7a). We also note
that when a coarse-grained events are defined as unions
of fine-grained events, Eq. (25), conditional probability
of the coarse grained event is:
p(κ|k) = 1 k ∈ κ , (28a)
p(κ|k) = 0 k 6∈ κ . (28b)
To demonstrate Lemma 5 we need one more property
– the fact that when a certain event U (p(U) = 1) can
be decomposed into two mutually exclusive events, U =
κ ∨ κ⊥, their probabilities must add to unity:
p(U) = p(κ ∨ κ⊥) = p(κ) + p(κ⊥) = 1 , (29)
This assumption introduces (in a very limited setting)
additivity. It is equivalent to the statement that “some-
thing will certainly happen”.
Proof of Lemma 5 starts with the observation that
probability of any composite event κ of the form of Eq.
(25) can be obtained recursively – by subtracting, one
by one, probabilities of all the fine-grained events that
belong to κ⊥, and exploiting the consequences of the im-
plication, Eq. (28), along with Eq. (29). Thus, as a first
step, we have:
p({k1 ∨ k2 ∨ . . . ∨ knκ ∨ . . . ∨ kN−1}+ p(kN ) = 1 .
Moreover, for all fine-grained events p(k) = 1N . Hence;
p({k1 ∨ k2 ∨ . . . ∨ knκ ∨ . . . ∨ kN−1} = 1− 1N .
Furthermore (and this is the next recursive step) the con-
ditional probability of the event {k1∨k2∨ . . .∨knκ ∨ . . .∨
kN−2} given the event {k1 ∨ k2 ∨ . . . ∨ knκ ∨ . . . ∨ kN−1}
is:
p({k1∨k2∨. . .∨kN−2}|{k1∨k2∨. . .∨kN−1}) = 1− 1N−1 ,
and so the unconditional probability must be:
p({k1∨k2∨. . .∨knκ∨. . .∨kN−2}| U) = (1− 1N )(1− 1N−1 ).
Repeating this procedure untill only the desired compos-
ite event κ remains we have:
p({k1∨k2∨ . . .∨knκ}) = (1− 1N ) . . . (1− 1N−(N−nκ−1) ).
After some elementary algebra we finally recover:
p({k1 ∨ k2 ∨ . . . ∨ knκ}) =
nκ
N
.
Hence, Eq. (26) holds. QED.
Corollary: Probability of mutually compatible exclusive
events κ, λ, µ, . . . that can be decomposed into unions of
envariantly swappable elementary events are additive:
p(κ ∨ λ ∨ µ ∨ . . .) = p(κ) + p(λ) + p(µ) + . . . (30)
Note that in establishing Lemma 5 we have only con-
sidered situations that can be reduced to certainty or im-
possibility (that is, cases corresponding to the absolute
value of the scalar product equal to 1 and 0). This is in
keeping with our strategy of deriving probability and, in
particular, of arriving at Born’s rule from certainty and
symmetries.
2. Algebra of records as the algebra of events
We can take this approach further. To this end, we
shall no longer require coarse-grained events to be mutu-
ally exclusive, although we shall continue to insists that
they are defined by the records inscribed in the pointer
states. Algebra of events [20] can be then defined by
simply identifying events with records. Logical product
of any two coarse-grained events κ, λ corresponds to the
product of the projection operators that act on the mem-
ory Hilbert space – on the corresponding records:
κ ∧ λ def= PκPλ = Pκ∧λ . (31a)
Logical sum is represented by a projection onto the union
of the Hilbert subspaces:
κ ∨ λ def= Pκ + Pλ − PκPλ = Pκ∨λ . (31b)
Last not least, a complement of the event κ corresponds
to:
κ⊥ def= PU − Pκ = Pκ⊥ . (31c)
With this set of definitions it is now fairly straightforward
to show:
Theorem 4: Events corresponding to the records stored
in the memory pointer states define a Boolean algebra.
Proof: To show that the algebra of records is Boolean
we need to show that coarse - grained events satisfy any
of the (several equivalent, see e.g. [42]) sets of axioms
that define Boolean algebras:
(a) Commutativity:
Pκ∨λ = Pλ∨κ; Pκ∧λ = Pλ∧κ . (32a, a′)
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(b) Associativity:
P(κ∨λ)∨µ = Pλ∨(κ∨µ); P(κ∧λ)∧µ = Pλ∧(κ∧µ) . (32b, b′)
(c) Absorptivity:
Pκ∨(λ)∧λ) = Pκ; Pκ∨(λ∧κ) = Pκ . (32c, c′)
(d) Distributivity:
Pκ∨(λ∧µ) = P(κ∨λ)∧(κ∨µ); Pκ∧(λ∨µ) = P(κ∧λ)∨(κ∧µ) .
(32d, d′)
(e) Orthocompletness:
Pκ∨(λ∧λ⊥) = Pκ; Pκ∧(λ∨λ⊥) = Pκ . (32e, e′)
Proofs of (a)-(e) are straightforward manipulations of
projection operators. We leave them as an exercise to
the interested reader. As an example we give the proof
of distributivity: Pκ∧(λ∨µ) = Pκ(Pλ + Pµ − PλPµ) =
PκPλ+PκPµ− (Pκ)2PλPµ = Pκ∧λ+Pκ∧µ−Pκ∧λPκ∧µ =
P(κ∧λ)∨(κ∧µ) . The other distributivity axiom is demon-
strated equally easily. QED.
These record projectors commute because records are
associated with the orthonormal pointer basis of the
memory of the observer or of the apparatus: It is im-
possible to consult memory cell in any other basis, so the
problems with distributivity pointed out by Birkhoff and
von Neumann [43] simply do not arise – when records are
kept in orthonormal pointer states, there is no need for
‘quantum logic’.
Theorem 4 entitles one to think of the outcomes of
measurements – of the records kept in various pointer
states – in classical terms. Projectors corresponding to
pointer subspaces define overlapping but compatible vol-
umes inside the memory Hilbert space. Algebra of such
composite events (defined as coarse grained records) is in-
deed Boolean. The danger of the loss of additivity (which
in quantum systems is intimately tied to the principle of
superposition) has been averted: Distributive law of clas-
sical logic holds.
3. Boole and Bohr: interpretational consequences
In a sense, this means that after a lengthy relative state
detour we have arrived at the resolution of the measure-
ment problem quite compatible with the one advocated
by Bohr [44]. The set of pointer states of the appara-
tus along with the prescription of how A will interact
with S suffices to define the “classical apparatus” Copen-
hagen interpretation demands as a key to the closure of
the ‘quantum phenomenon’ brought about by a measure-
ment. Our analysis shows how one can put together such
a “classical apparatus” from quantum components. Con-
tinuous entangling interactions of the memory of the ob-
server or of the pointer of the apparatus with the envi-
ronment are essential. They assure einselection, yielding
commuting (and, hence, Boolean – see e.g. Ref [45]) sets
of events – sets of future records.
As we have already noted, there is a significant differ-
ence between the transition from quantum to (effectively)
classical we have described above and a measurement
on an ab initio classical system, where one can always
imagine that there is a preexisting answer, waiting to
be revealed by the measurement. In the quantum case
the answer is induced by the measurement: Uncertainty
about the outcome arises when the observer who knows
the initial state of the system changes the observable of
interest. Once the record has been made, and the in-
teraction with the environment singled out the preferred
pointer basis, one can act “as if”, from then on, there was
a definite but unknown outcome – a probabilistic, effec-
tively classical preexisting event. Inconsistencies in this
neo-Copenhagen strategy based on the existential inter-
pretation could be exposed only if observer had perfect
control of the environment, and decided to forgo knowl-
edge of the state of S in favor of the global state of SE .
One of the most intriguing conclusions from the study
of the consequences of envariance for quantum measure-
ments is the incompatibility between the observer finding
out (and, therefore, knowing) the outcome on one hand,
and his ability to expose quantum aspects of the whole
on the other: Whenever entanglement is present, the two
are obviously complementary. Once the state of the ob-
server is described by (and therefore tied to) a certain
outcome, he looses the ability to control global observ-
ables he would need to access to confirm overall coherence
of the state vector. One of the virtues of the existential
interpretation is the clarity with which this complemen-
tarity is exhibited.
Specifying measurement scheme along with the cou-
pling to the environment – and, hence, with the set
of pointer states – fixes menu of the possible events.
We have already demonstrated (Theorem 4) that such
events associated with future records can be consistently
assigned probabilities. The question that remains con-
cerns the relation between these probabilities and the
pre-measurement state vector. We have arrived at a par-
tial answer: Whenever the complete set of commuting
observables can be fine-grained into events that are en-
variantly swappable, the associated fine-grained proba-
bilities must be equal. We also note that when some
potential record state appears with a coefficient that is
identically equal to zero, it must be assigned zero proba-
bility. This is very much a consequence of the existential
interpretation: Observer with the corresponding record
simply does not exist in the universal state vector. Last
not least, probabilities of mutually exclusive events are
additive.
We conclude that the theory of probability that refers
to the records inscribed in the pointer states singled out
by envariance can be consistently developed as a classi-
cal probability theory. This is in spite of the fact that
quantum states these records refer to cannot be consis-
tently represented by probabilities. A good example of
this situation is provided by the Bell’s inequalities [46].
There the measurement outcomes cannot be predicted
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by assuming any probability distribution over the states
of the members of the measured EPR pair, but records
of these outcomes are perfectly classical. This is because
“an event is not an event untill it becomes a record of
an event”, as one could say paraphrasing John Wheeler’s
paraphrase [37] of Niels Bohr. Entangled state of two
spins cannot be associated with “events” that correspond
to different non-compatible basis states. However, once
these states have been recorded in the preferred basis of
the apparatus, event space can be defined by the records
and all the steps that lead to probabilities can be taken.
C. Born’s rule for the probability of a record
Consider now the case of unequal coefficients, Eq. (8a).
After it is recorded by one of the memory cells of the
observer we get:
|ψSAE〉 =
N∑
k=1
√
mk/M |sk〉|Ak〉|εk〉 , (33)
with M =
∑N
k=1mk. Observer can verify that the joint
state of SAE is indeed ψSAE by a direct measurement in
which one of his memory cells is treated as an external
system. Given this information (i.e., the form of the joint
state, Eq. (33)) he can convince himself that Born’s rule
holds – that it gives correct answers about the probabili-
ties of various potential records |Ak〉, and corresponding
outcome states |sk〉 (which need not be orthogonal – see
discussion following Eq. (22)). This can be seen in sev-
eral different ways [2-4] of which we choose the following:
Consider another pre-measurement involving a counter C
that leads to;
|ψSEC〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
√
mk|sk〉|εk〉|Ck〉 (34)
This correlation can be established either by interaction
with S, or E (although this last option may be preferred,
as it seems ‘safer’ – in absence of any interaction with S
probabilities of future records |Ak〉’s should not change).
In any case, the fact that this can be done by interaction
with either S or E leading to the same |ψSEC〉 proves that
this “safety concern” was not really justified.
As before, we now imagine that:
|Ck〉 =
µk∑
jk=µk−1+1
|cjk〉/
√
mk (35)
with µk = µk−1 + mk, and µ0 = 0. Note that the
observer knows the initial state of the system |ϕ〉, Eq.
(12a). Hence, we can safely assume that he also knows
coefficients of the state ψSE or ψSAE he will be dealing
with. Therefore, finding C with the desired dimension-
ality of the respective subspaces and correlating it with
E in the right way is not a “hit or miss” proposition
– it can be always accomplished using the information
in the observer’s possession. It is also straightforward in
principle to find the environment degrees of freedom that
would decohere the fine-grained states of C, so that the
complete state would become:
|ΨSEC〉 ∝
M∑
jk=1
|sk(jk), cjk〉|ejk〉 (36)
where k(j) = k iff µk−1 < j ≤ µk. This state is obviously
envariant under swaps of |sk(jk), cjk〉. Hence, by Eq. (7a);
pjk ≡ p(cjk) ≡ p(|sk(jk), cjk〉) = 1/M .
Moreover, measurement of the observable with the eigen-
states {|sk〉} yields:
|A0〉|ΨSEC〉 ∝
N∑
k=1
|Ak〉
µk∑
jk=µk−1+1
|sk(jk), cjk〉|ejk〉 . (37)
These disjoint sets correspond to different record states
|Ak〉 that are labled by k, each of them containing mk in-
dividual equiprobable events. Therefore, using Eq. (26),
Lemma 5, and its Corollary, we recover Born’s rule:
pk ≡ p(sk) =
µk∑
jk=µk−1+1
p(|sk(jk), |cjk〉) = mk/M = |ak|2
(38)
As before, extending it to the case of when the proba-
bilities are not rational is straightforward since rational
numbers are dense among the reals.
This appeal to continuity can be made more precise
now, providing we recognize that – essentially as a con-
sequence of Lemma 5 – probability of an event λ that
includes event κ must be at least as large as the proba-
bility of κ:
κ ∈ λ ⇒ p(κ) ≤ p(λ) . (39)
This is easily seen as a consequence of Eqs. (29) and
(30). It is then straightforward to set up a limiting pro-
cedure that bounds an irrational probability from above
and from below with sequences of states with rational
probabilities such that m−ν /Mν ≤ p(κ) ≤ m+ν /Mν ≤. As
Mν approaches infinity, p(κ) = |ακ|2 obtains in the limit.
We have waited until now with detailing this conti-
nuity argument because it can be rigorously put forward
only after additivity of probabilities has been established.
And, as was known since the inception of modern quan-
tum theory, superposition principle is in conflict with ad-
ditivity of probabilities: For example, Eq. (39) would not
hold if ‘events’ were not associated with the records, as
Eq. (30) does not hold for arbitrary states. Further-
more, Eq. (30) and the distributivity axiom are violated
in double slit experiment if ‘particle passing through the
left (right) slit’ are identified as events. They regain va-
lidity when ‘the (pointer basis) record of a particle pass-
ing through the left (right) slit’ are regarded as events.
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We note again that this is essentially Bohr’s mantra, as
reported by Wheeler [37]! The only difference is that the
record need not be made by an ab initio a classical ap-
paratus – an effectively classical apparatus with a set of
memory states fixed as a consequence of incessant mon-
itoring by E suffices to do the job. It takes a bit more
effort to extend Born’s rule to the case of continuous
spectra. We show hoe to do that in Appendix A.
In this section we have established that events asso-
ciated with anticipated future records correspond to a
Boolean structure. This allowed us to assign probabilities
to potential outcomes. Any compatible set of outcomes
– any set of measurements that can be associated with
orthonormal memory states of the observer, apparatus,
etc. – can be analysed in this fashion. Observer makes
a choice of what he will measure, but the inevitable en-
tangling interaction with the environment will select a
certain preferred set of pointer states. So, ultimately,
observer uses probabilities to anticipate his future state.
Once we have established that pointer states can be as-
signed probabilities, we have asked about their connec-
tion with the coefficients of the pre-measurement state
of the system. Here the answer was based on the same
idea of envariance invoked in Section II. In effect, coarse-
grained outcome states are compatible and can be always
fine-grained by using suitable ancilla so that Hilbert -
space volumes corresponding to various possible compat-
ible fine-grained outcomes contain same “concentrations”
of probability. This was done by “dilution” of the original
state with the help of the counterweight - ancilla C. En-
variance can be then used to confirm that all of the fine-
grained cells must be assigned the same measure – and
hence, the same probability. The probability of coarse-
grained events was derived by counting the number of
fine-grained cells. It is given (as we have established in
Lemma 5) by the fraction of the total number of such en-
variant (and, hence, equivalent) cells. This is very much
in the spirit of Laplacean definition of probability – “ratio
of the number of favorable events to the total number of
events”. The advantage of the quantum discussion rests
in its ability to rigorously show when such elementary
events are envariantly swappable, and, hence equiproba-
ble. This transforms a subjective definition based on the
state of mind of the observer into objective, experimen-
tally testable, statement about symmetries of entangled
states.
VI. BORN’S RULE, RELATIVE FREQUENCIES,
AND ENVARIANCE
Envariance - based derivation of Born’s rule introduces
probability as a tool observer adopts to predict the fu-
ture – or, more precisely, to predict his future state given
that he decides to measure some specific observable. Out-
comes of planned measurements are uncertain because of
quantum indeterminacy. Even when observer knows all
that can be known about the system – even when S is
in a pure state – ignorance appears whenever the to - be
- measured observable does not have the state prepared
by the preceding measurement among its eigenstates.
Observers aim is to assess likelihood of a particular
future record in comparison with the alternatives. The
measure that emerges is based on the equiprobability of
certain mutually exclusive events (orthogonal states) un-
der swaps. They are provably equally probable because
the global SE state can be restored by counterswaps in
the environment. Environment can be invoked already
for pure state of S, Eq. (12), when contemplating pos-
sible outcomes of the future measurements: it will in-
evitably and predictably entangle with the records caus-
ing decoherence and unpredictability.
The fundamentally predictive role of probabilities re-
flected in our derivation of Born’s rule is often contrasted
with the “relative frequency interpretation” [18,19].
Imagine an observer who – instead of counting numbers
of mutually exclusive envariantly swappable states – per-
forms the same experiment over and over, and infers his
chances of getting a certain outcome in the next round
from the past records, by assuming that he is in effect
dealing with an infinite ensemble deduced from his finite
data.
Supporters of the Bayesian / Laplacean ‘epistemic’ and
subjective view of probabilities and of the opposing ‘rela-
tive frequency’ approach have been often at odds, taking
their own views to dogmatic extremes while pointing out
flaws of the opposition [19]. The central difficulty pointed
out by the frequentists in their criticism of the Bayesian
approach – that ignorance gives one no right to make any
inferences, and hence, no right to assign any probabilities
to the possible outcomes – is difficult to ignore. There-
fore, Bayesian appeals to symmetry through the principle
of indifference are inappropriate when they involve ‘state
of mind’ of the observer.
However, while such criticisms are very relevant in
the classical setting, they simply do not apply here:
In quantum physics ignorance of a future outcome can
be demonstrated and quantified by employing objective
symmetries of the preexisting state (that can be perfectly
known to the observer). This was our strategy. Thus, in
questions of fundamental significance it would seem ap-
propriate to deduce probability by identifying the rele-
vant quantum symmetry – envariance under swaps – and
by counting the fundamentally swappable (and, hence,
equiprobable) outcomes.
This strategy may not be always applicable. For in-
stance, in some situations where such fundamentally
equiprobable events are difficult to identify. So, reliance
on actuarian tables in the insurance business is difficult
to question. However, in quantum measurements we are
dealing with probabilities of a single event at a very fun-
damental level. Frequencies should be secondary. Rela-
tive frequency approach was rightly criticized for requir-
ing infinite ensembles. Indeed, this task of extrapolating
– deducing infinite ensemble required for future predic-
tions from the relative frequencies of the past outcomes
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– involves a subjective element studied e.g. by de Finetti
[47].
Nevertheless, even when one can deduce probabilities
a priori using envariance, they better be consistent with
the relative frequencies estimated by the observer a pos-
teriori in sufficiently large samples. Such a “consistency
check” is one of the motivations for this section. More
importantly, our discussion will explore and clarify the
relation of the a priori probabilities with the relative fre-
quencies. This has significance for the understanding of
the implications of envariance in the existential interpre-
tation of quantum physics. We shall conclude that when
probabilities can be deduced directly from the pure state,
the two approaches are in agreement, but that the a pri-
ori probabilities obtained from envariance - based argu-
ments are more fundamental.
Given the central idea of our approach – that the symp-
toms of classicality and the effective collapse are induced
by the interaction with the environment – we shall con-
duct our discussion in the relative state setting. Thus,
we imagine observer presented with a large ensemble of
systems, each prepared in the same state |ϕ〉, Eq. (12).
Observer employs a counter C to (pre-)measure each of
the systems in the same basis |sk〉:
|C0〉⊗N |ϕ〉⊗N {|sk〉}=⇒ . . . =⇒︸ ︷︷ ︸
N
. . .
. . .
N∏
l=1
( N∑
k=1
〈sk|ϕ〉|Ck〉|sk〉
)
l
= |ΦNSC〉 . (40)
Note that above N measurements are carried out ‘in par-
allel’, one on each of N systems. We have reflected this
difference in notation by using “=⇒” instead of “−→”
of, say, Eq. (11b). To simplify the notation we limit
our considerations to the case when there are just two
possible outcomes, so that;
|s1〉 = |0〉 , |s2〉 = |1〉 ,
with 〈0|1〉 = 0. Moreover, as before, we imagine that
for some integer m and M (0 < m < M) we have
|α|2 = |〈0|ϕ〉|2 = m/M, |α|2 + |β|2 = 1, so that a count-
able way exists to further “resolve” the state above into
superpositions that have the same absolute values of the
coefficients. In this manner, starting from
|ϕ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (12c)
we arrive at
|ΦNSCE〉 ∝
N∏
l=1
( m∑
j=1
|0〉|cj〉|ej〉+
M∑
j=m+1
|1〉|cj〉|ej〉
)
l
. (41)
The steps that lead to this state in the composite Hilbert
space (HS⊗HC⊗HE)⊗N can be reproduced by the reader
following the strategy of Section II. We assume (in anal-
ogy with Eqs. (9) & (35)) that:
|C0〉 =
m∑
j=1
|cj〉/
√
m ; |C1〉 =
M∑
j=m+1
|cj〉/
√
M −m .
In effect, we assume that the Hilbert space of each
counter cell has a sufficient dimensionality to allow for
the increased resolution needed to “even the odds” be-
tween the mutually exclusive fine-grained |cj〉.
We can now carry out the product in Eq. (41). The
resulting sum has MN distinct terms:
|ΦNSCE〉 = M−N
∑
{hC}
|hSCE〉 . (42a)
Individual recorded histories have the form of ordered
products:
|hSCE〉 = . . . (|0〉k1 |cj≤m〉k1 |ej〉k1) . . . (|1〉k2 |cj>m〉k2 |ej〉k2) . . .
(43a)
That is, they reflect individual sequences of fine - grained
records made by the observer. Each |hSCE〉 is completely
determined by the history of fine - grained counts:
|hC〉 = . . . |cj〉k1 . . . |cj〉k2 . . . (43b)
Thus, hSC is obviously implied by hC . Moreover, by as-
sumption, states of the N distinct environments are in-
dividually Schmidt, Eq. (41), that is orthonormal and in
one - to - one correspondence with the states of C. So,
in the end, given the initial state of E , each hSCE is com-
pletely determined by hC : The history of the fine-grained
counts implies the whole history of measurements – se-
quences of the detected states of the system as well as
the ‘history of decoherence’:
|hSCE〉 =
N∏
k=1
(|sk(cj)〉|cj〉|ej〉)k = |hS(hC)〉⊗|hC〉⊗|hE(hC)〉 .
(44)
This structure of the set of complete histories and the
fact that hC ⇒ hSC as well as hC ⇒ hSCE are impor-
tant for two reasons. We shall use it to prove that the
superensemble |ΦNSCE〉 is suitably envariant (so that we
can attribute the same probability to the distinct his-
tories hSC). Moreover, we shall have to count numbers
of equiprobable histories that yield the same numbers of
detections (of, say, “1”) in S to compute relative frequen-
cies.
Let us start with the proof of envariance. We need
to demonstrate that any two fine-grained histories hSC
that appear in the above superensemble, Eq. (44), can
be envariantly swapped. A general form of the history
representing correlated states of S and C only is:
|hSCj1j2...jN 〉 = |s1〉|cj1〉 |s2〉|cj2〉 . . . |sk〉|cjk〉 . . . |sN 〉|cjN 〉
(45)
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The SC swap operator that exchanges any two histories
is given by:
uSC(hSCj1j2...jN ⇀↽ h
SC
j′
1
j′
2
...j′
N
) = |hSCj1j2...jN 〉〈hSCj′1j′2...j′N |+h.c.
(46a)
or, more succinctly;
uSC(hSC ⇀↽ h′SC) = |hSC〉〈h′SC |+ h.c. (46b)
When both histories appear in the state, Eq. (41), this
swap can be obviously undone by a counterswap in the
environment:
uE(hEj1j2...jN ⇀↽ h
E
j′
1
j′
2
...j′
N
) = |ej1〉...|ejN 〉〈ej′N |...〈ej1′ |+h.c.
(46c)
We have now established that each fine-grained history
in our many - worlds version of an ensemble has the same
probability:
p(h) =M−N . (47)
To facilitate the calculation of the relative frequencies
we sort superensemble of Eq. (42a) which hasMN terms
into 2N terms that differ only by the pattern of detections
of the state “|1〉” (i.e., we group different fine-resolution
terms together). Next, we group these 2N terms into
N +1 terms that differ only in the total number n of 1’s
(i.e., we ignore the “order of appearance” of 0’s and 1’s).
This operation involves summing up numbers of detec-
tions of 1’s. It could even be implemented in the mem-
ory of the apparatus or of the observer by a register ℜ.
Register performs a unitary transformation – a ‘subrou-
tine’ that operates on states of the counter C that has
the record of the complete fine-grained history. Register
sums up the number of detections of 1, and writes down
the result “n” in the suitable register cell:
ℜ|0〉ℜ|hC〉 = |n〉ℜ|hC〉 .
Register cell could work equally well by summing up the
number of 1’s directly in the states of the system S, Eq.
(43a), but it seems more appropriate to let the observer
use C for this purpose. Register cell has at least N pos-
sible states.
The result can be written in the abbreviated from as:
|ΦNSCℜE〉 ∝
∑
hC
|n〉ℜ|hSC〉|hE〉 = (42b)
N∑
n=0
(N
n
)
|n〉ℜ|0〉N−n|1〉n(
m∑
j=1
|cj〉|ej〉)N−n(
M∑
j=m+1
|cj〉|ej〉)n.
(42c)
The first line above has all the MN histories – it rep-
resents the whole superensemble before any sorting was
implemented. Eq. (42c) groups histories with the same
numbers of 1’s together. There, we have compensated
for not distinguishing between
(N
n
)
distinct sequences of
0’s and 1’s with the coefficient.
The probability that the observer will detect n of 1’s in
N measurements is proportional to the number of envari-
antly swappable fine-grained histories with n detections
of 1:
pN (n) =
(N
n
)
mN−n(M −m)n
MN
=
(N
n
)
|α|2(N−n)|β|n .
(48)
This is of course the familiar binomial distribution. As
before, we can address the case when probabilities are
not commensurate by noting that rational numbers are
dense among reals. Generalisation to the case when there
are more than two outcomes is straightforward.
The above discussion was valid for any N . We now
note that, for a large N binomial distribution of Eq. (48)
can be approximated by a Gaussian:
pN (n) =
(N
n
)
|α|2(N−n)|β|n
≈ 1√
2πN|αβ| exp{−
(
n−N|β|2√N|αβ|
)2
} . (49)
Hence, in the limit of large N relative frequency of 1’s is
sharply peaked around the value predicted by the Born’s
rule:
rBorn =
nBorn
N = |β|
2 . (50)
The peak has a finite width, so that the expected devia-
tion δn is of the order:
δn =
√
N|αβ| . (51)
Generalization to the case when there are more than two
outcomes is straightforward: All of the steps leading to
Eq. (48) can be repeated, and the large - N limit can be
the taken using Tchebychev’s theorem [20].
While the relative frequency r = n/N is sharply
peaked around rBorn, its ‘correct’ value, the probabil-
ity that the number of 1’s concides exactly with nBorn
predicted by Eq. (50) tends to decrease with increasing
N . This is so even when |β|2 is a rational number with a
denominator that is a multiple of N . More significantly,
the count of envariantly swappable histories that yield
n ∈ [nBorn −∆n, nBorn +∆n] decreases with increasing
half-width of the distribution, Eq. (51), as ∆n/
√N|αβ|.
On the other hand, half-width of the distribution in-
creases only with
√N . Therefore, for a sufficiently large
N almost all histories will yield relative frequency within
any fixed size relative frequency interval rBorn − ∆r <
r < rBorn +∆r. Moreover,
lim
N→∞
pN (n/N ) = δ(r − rBORN ) . (52)
Analogous conclusions are known in the standard proba-
bility theory [20]. We recount them here for the quantum
superensemble, Eq. (42), as similar questions have led to
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confusion in the past in the quantum setting of Many
Worlds relative frequency derivations (see e.g. the criti-
cal comments of Squires [28] pointing out inconsistencies
of the frequency operator - based approaches [22,23] to
the derivation of Born’s rule).
It is tempting to compare superensemble of Eqs. (42)
and (44) with the ‘collective’ employed (especially by von
Mises [18]) to define probabilities using relative frequen-
cies. Collective is an ordered infinite ensemble of events
when; (i) it allows for the existence of limiting relative
frequencies that are (ii) independent under a selection
(using so-called ‘place selection function’) of any infinite
subset of the members of the collective. Place selec-
tion functions are meant to represent betting strategies:
Player (or obsrever) can select (or reject) the next mem-
ber of an ensemble using any algorithm that does not
refer to the outcomes of future measurements – to the
state of the next member of the ensemble – but only to
its ‘adress’, its ‘place’ in the ensemble. There was initially
some controversy related to this randomness postulate:
Obviously, it is possible to influence limits in infinite se-
ries by selecting subsets of terms. This problem has been
however settled (more or less along the lines anticipated
by von Mises) by the work of Solomonoff, Kolmogorov,
and Chiatin: Algorithmic randomness they have intro-
duced (see [48] for overview and references) provides a
deep and rigorous definition of what is random. How-
ever, the very idea of using infinite ensembles to define
probabilities forces one to extrapolate finite data sets –
outcomes of measurements. Any such extrapolation is a
subjective guess.
Chance and determinism combine in an unanticipated
manner in quantum theory: Everettian superensemble
of Eq. (42) evolves unitarily, and, hence deterministi-
cally. Nevertheless, it satisfies a natural generalization of
the von Mises’ randomness postulate without any restric-
tions on place selection functions. This is easy to see, as
each measurement yields every outcome with the same
coefficients, so choosing any subset of measurements –
any subset of k’s in the product representation of the su-
perensemble – will have no effect on the limiting relative
frequencies.
The randomness postulate of von Mises is mirrored by
the assumption of ‘exchangeability’ introduced in a fun-
damentally very different (‘subjectivist’) approach based
on decision theory (see e.g., de Finetti [47]). There the
goal is to deduce probability of the next outcome from a
finite sequence of outcomes of preceding measurements.
Exchangeability is meant to assure that ‘rules of the
game’ do not change as the consecutive measurements are
carried out. It captures the (von Mises’) idea that each
new measurement is ‘drawn at random from the same
collective’ but – in keeping with the Laplacean spirit –
avoids reference to a pre-existing infinite ensembles. Su-
perensemble of Eqs. (40)-(42) is obviously exchangeable:
its is a superposition of all possible ensembles, with all
possible relative frequencies. Hence, the order of any
two measurements can be permuted with no effect on
the partial relative frequencies, etc., providing that the
preparation of the initial state vector and the measured
observable remain unchanged.
‘Maverick branches’ with relative frequencies that are
inconsistent with Born’s rule (e.g., a branch with 1’s
only) plagued Many Worlds relative frequency approach
[21-28]. Maverick branches are ‘alive and well’ in the su-
perensemble, but have negligible probabilities (deduced
now directly from envariance) and, therefore, for N ≫ 1,
are of little consequence. We have already discussed the
case of small departures above. As the number N of mea-
surements increases, probability of detecting a frequency
that is inconsistent with the predictions of Born’s rule
becomes negligible in accord with Eqs. (42), (48) and
(49). Thus, it is conceivable but very improbable that ob-
server will record in his experiments relative frequency of
1’s that is far from rBorn.
VII. DISCUSSION
Past approaches to the derivation of Born’s rule have
often had, usually as an explicitly stated goal, ‘recovery’
of the classical definition probabilities. Limitations in-
herent in such a formulation of the problem were in part
responsible for their limited success. ‘Recovery’ of somet-
ing as ill-defined and controversial as any of the classical
definitions of probability was bound to be plagued with
difficulties. Moreover, ‘recovery’ of classical probabilities
suggests that the process should start with getting rid of
the most quantum aspects of quantum theory to make it
closer to classical.
The only known way to recognize effective classicality
in a wholly quantum Universe is based on decoherence.
But decoherence is ‘off limits’ as it employs tools depen-
dent on Born’s rule. On the other hand, when classi-
cality was ‘imposed by force’ by Gleason [30] or in Refs.
[31,32], this seemed to work to a degree, although in-
terpretational issues were left largely unaddressed and
doubts have rightly persisted [26-29,33].
A. Envariance and decoherence
We have taken a very different approach. Derivation of
Born’s rule described here is extravagantly quantum: En-
variance relies on entanglement, perhaps the most quan-
tum manifestation of quantum physics, still regarded by
some as a ‘paradox’. Instead of first taming quantum the-
ory to make it look classical, we have used purely quan-
tum symmetries of entangled states as a key to unlocking
the meaning of probability in a quantum Universe. So,
to arrive at Born’s rule we have put aside (at least tem-
porarily) tools – and hence, results – of decoherence, as
relying on them threatened circularity. This meant that
even such basic symptoms of classicality and key ingre-
dients of contemporary quantum measurement theory as
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the einselection of preferred pointer states had to be mo-
tivated and re-derived anew.
Putting aside tools and results of decoherence did not
force us to forget about the role of the environment. To
understand emergence of the classical one must regard
quantum mechanics as theory of correlations between
systems. This stresses the relational aspects of quantum
states emphasized by Rovelli [49]. Moreover, to under-
stand the origins of ignorance, to motivate introduction
of probabilities, and to appreciate their role in making
predictions one needs to analyse systems that interact
with their environments, and focus on correlations that
survive in such open settings.
Once these (in retrospect, natural) steps are taken, it
is possible to see how observer can be ignorant about
the outcome of the measurement he is about to per-
form on the perfectly known system – on S that is in
a pure state: Ignorance of the future outcome arises as
a consequence of quantum indeterminacy and the inter-
action (of the system, the pointer of apparatus, or of the
observers memory) with the environment. Decoherence
inevitably follows pre-measurements. Entanglement be-
tween the system and the memory takes memory out of
the ‘ready to measure’ pointer state into a superposition
of (outcome) pointer states. This in turn means that
the SA entanglement spreads into the correlations with
the environment in such a way that the observer may as
well assume from the outset that S (and / or A) was
entangled with E .
Eigenstates of the to - be - measured hermitean observ-
able turn – as a result of measurement and decoherence
– into Schmidt states of S in the resulting decomposition
of the entangled state of SE . This is also the case when
E is in a mixed state to begin with – such states can
be purified, and conclusions about the Schmidt states
of S follow. The rest of our argument goes through
unimpeded. Thus, observer may as well recognise the
inevitable and focus on the remaining information about
the system that can be deduced from the resulting entan-
gled state. Envariance can be then readily demonstrated
and – given additional assumptions we shall not recapit-
ulate here – used to arrive at Born’s rule. And when
measurements are not ideal, (i.e., do not preserve the
state of the system, do not correlate record states with
orthonormal states of S, etc.) future record states of A
(which can be safely assumed to be orthogonal) can be
used to motivate envariance – based approach.
One key difference between the classical definition of
probability and the quantum view of the envariant origin
of ignorance and our derivation of Born’s rule for proba-
bilities is the reliability of the prior information about the
state of the system available to the observer in the quan-
tum case: That is, observer can use his information about
the initial state of the system |ϕ〉 to assess chances of out-
comes of future measurements on S he may contemplate.
In classical discussions the nature and the implications of
ignorance were the most contentious issues [17-20]. Infer-
ing prior probability distribution ‘from ignorance alone’
is impossible, as was rightly noted by frequentists. At-
tempts to invoke symmetry [50] were ultimately uncon-
vincing [19], as they had to refer to subjective knowledge
of the observer, and not to the underlying physical state.
By contrast, in quantum physics observer can reli-
ably deduce the extent of his ignorance about the future
outcome from the perfect information he has about the
present state of the system, and verify his symmetry ar-
guments by performing appropriate swaps and confirma-
tory measurements on the state of e.g., the composite SE .
This approach preserves some of the spirit of Laplace,
but now the analogue of ‘indifference’ is no longer sub-
jective: It is grounded in measurable – and testable if not
yet deliberately tested – quantum symmetry of entangled
states.
Once inevitability of correlations with E is recognised,
their key consequence – environment - induced supers-
election – can be recovered without usual tools of deco-
herence: Trace and reduced density matrices can be put
aside in favor of more fundamental approach based on
correlations and environment - assisted invariance. En-
variance shows that phases of states appearing in the
Schmidt decomposition are of no consequence for re-
sults of any measurement on the subsystem S (or, for
that matter, E) of the whole SE . So, superpositions
of Schmidt states of S cannot exist, as relative Schmidt
phases have no bearing on the state of S.
B. Envariance behind the ignorance
Envariance pinpoints the source of ignorance: It is ul-
timately traced to the global (quantum) symmetry of en-
tangled states which in turn implies non-local character
of quantum phases of the coefficients in the Schmidt de-
composition. This immediately leads to the envariance
of swaps – they are generated by changing phases in the
eigenvalues of unitaries diagonal in a basis complemen-
tary (e.g., Hadamard) to the eigenstates of the to - be
- measured hermitean observable. Swaps are envariant
when the state is even and the corresponding Schmidt
coefficients have the same absolute values: Non-locality
of phases implies ignorace about states of subsystems,
and, hence, of the outcome. Once envariance of phases
is accepted, envariance under swaps follows and implies
equiprobability. A simple counting argument leads then
very naturally to Born’s rule in case when coefficients
have unequal absolute values.
Note that even an observer presented with an unlim-
ited supply of copies of the “S half” of identically pre-
pared SE pairs will eventually conclude – having carried
out all the conceivable measurements – that the state of
S is mixed, and can be represented by the usual reduced
density matrix. This is a significant difference from other
approaches, which do not recognize the role of the envi-
ronment. It further underscores the objective nature of
probabilities implying ignorance about the future out-
comes. Similar level of objectivity is impossible to attain
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in approaches that do not recognize role of the environ-
ment in the quantum - classical transition precipitated by
quantum measurements. In particular, in absence of en-
tanglement with some E purity of the underlying state of
S would make it impossible to apply arguments based on
permuting outcomes to pure states of the system: Such
permutations generally change the state of the system,
and can be detected. As the local state is altered, there is
no compelling reason to assume that probabilities would
remain unchanged.
An example of an approach threatened by this diffi-
culty is Wallace’s elaboration [36] of an idea – due to
Deutsch [24] – to apply decision theory to pure states
in order to arrive at Born’s rule. In the original paper
[24] this difficulty was not obvious as the presentation
left open the possibility of a “Copenhagen” point of view
with explicit collapse, where phases do not matter. In-
deed, early criticism by Barnum et al. [51] was based on
inconsistencies implied by the ‘Copenhagen reading’ of
Ref. [24]. Wallace has pointed out in a series of more
recent papers that that criticism does not apply to the
“Everettian reading” of [24]. The approach of Ref. [36]
is however open to two separate charges. Reliance on the
(classical) decision theory makes the arguments of [24]
and [36] very much dependent on decoherence as Wallace
often emphasizes. But as we have noted repeatedly, de-
coherence cannot be practiced without an independent
prior derivation of Born’s rule. Thus, Wallace’s argu-
ments (as well as similar ‘operational approach’ of Saun-
ders [52]) appear to be circular. Even more important is
the second problem; permuting potential outcomes (e.g.,
using swaps to change |α〉 ∝ |1〉 + |2〉 − |3〉 + |4〉 into
|β〉 ∝ |1〉+ |3〉− |2〉+ |4〉) changes the state of an isolated
system. And a different state of S could imply differ-
ent probabilities. So the key step – irrelevance of the
phases for probabilities of the outcomes (which we have
demonstrated in Theorem 1 by showing that state of S is
unaffected by envariant transformations) – cannot be es-
tablished without either relying on E or some very strong
assumptions that would have to, in effect, invalidate the
principle of superposition.
Early assesments of envariance - based derivation of
Born’s rule [13,16,53] are incisive but also generally pos-
itive. They have focused on the equal coefficients part
of the proof, covered here by Theorems 1 and 2. This
is understandable, as the proof of equiprobability from
envariance is the key to the rest of the derivation. The
consensus so far seems to be that, apart from the need
to clarify some of the steps (the task we undertook here)
the envariant derivation [2-4] of Born’s rule stands. In-
deed, as argued by Barnum, assumptions of the original
derivation could be relaxed by exploiting consequences
of envariance more completely [13]. Moreover, there are
several interesting and non-trivial variants of the origi-
nal proof [3,13,16], which suggests that envariance-based
derivation is robust, and that the vein of the physical
intuition it has tapped is far from exhausted.
This paper was also written as a critical if (under-
standably) friendly review and extension of Refs. [2-
4], although with a different focus: Any attempt at the
derivation of Born’s rule must be completely independent
of any and all of its consequences we have come to take
for granted. Therefore, my focus here was to look for
circularity, and to make certain that there is none in the
derivation. In this spirit, I have fleshed - out the ‘deco-
herence - free’ definition of pointer states that was briefly
discussed in Refs. [2] and [3].
Pointer states are the key ingredient of the quantum
measurement theory. They define the alternatives in the
‘no collapse’ approach to measurement – they are the
potential events observer is going to place bets on using
probabilities. Their existence was demonstrated using
envariance - inspired argument – by exploring stability of
correlations (e.g, apparatus-system) in the ‘open’ setting
– in presence of envariance.
We have noted the dilemma of the observer who can ei-
ther settle for the perfect knowledge of the whole – of the
global state which is useless for most purposes but could
in principle allow for reversibility – or opt to find out the
outcome of his measurement, which will irrevocably ‘tie
him down’ to the branch labelled by the outcome. These
existential consequences of the information acquisition
would preclude him from reversing the measurement.
Noncommutativity of the relevant global and local ob-
servables is then ultimately responsible for the observer’s
inability “to be a Maxwell’s demon” – to find out the
outcome while retaining the option of reversing the evo-
lution. Thus, envariance sheds a new light on the origins
of the second law in the context of measurements, com-
plementing ideas discussed to date (see e.g. [54-56]) and
may be even relevant to some old questions concerning
verifiability and consistency of quantum theory [57].
In particular, complementarity of global and local in-
formation emphasizes the difference between attempting
reversal in classical and quantum settings: In classical
physics the state of the whole is a Cartesian product
of the states of parts. Hence, in classical physics per-
fect knowledge of the state of the whole implies perfect
knowledge of all the parts. In quantum physics only a
subset of states of measure zero in the composite Hilbert
space – pure product states – allow for that. In all other
cases (which are entangled) knolwedge of the local state
(i.e., of S precludes knowledge of the global state (i.e., of
SA or SE). But it is the global state that is needed to
implement a reversal. We shall pursue this insight into
the origins of irreversibility elsewhere.
C. Remaining questions and future research
Our study of the quantum origins of probability has
not addressed all of the questions that can and should be
raised. It is therefore appropriate to point out some of the
issues that will benefit from further study. We start by
noting the paramount role of the division of the Universe
into systems. Systems are the subject of axioms (o) and
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(ii), as well as facts 1-3 of Section II. I have signalled
this question before [3,8], but as yet there has been really
no discernible progress towards the fundamental answer
of what defines a system.
Another interesting issue is the distinction between
‘proper’ and ‘improper’ mixtures (see e.g. [58]) and the
extent to which this may be relevant to the definition
of probabilities. An example of a proper mixture is an
ensemble of pure orthonormal states (eigenstates of its
density matrix) mixed in the right proportions. All that
decoherence can offer are, of course ‘improper mixtures’.
It has been often argued that improper mixtures cannot
be interpreted through an appeal to ignorance [53,58,59].
I believe there is no point belaboring this issue here: As
we have noted before, observer can be ignorant of his
future state, of the outcome of the measurement he has
decided to carry out.
Whether this sort of ignorance is what used to be
meant by ‘ignorance’ in the past discussion of the ori-
gin of probabilities may be of some historical interest,
but ignorance of the outcome of the future measurement
is clearly a legitimate use of the concept, and, as we have
seen above, quite fruitful. In a sense we have touched
on an issue related to the distinction between proper and
improper mixtures when we have distinguished between
priors observer can get from someone else (‘the preparer’,
see discussion of Eq. (11)) and from his own records.
The ‘gut feeling’ of this author is that all the mixtures
are due to entanglement or correlations – that they are
all ultimately ‘improper’. This is certainly possible if the
Universe, as a whole, is quantum. This is also suggested
by quantum formalism, which ‘refuses to recognize’ (e.g.,
in the form of density matrices) any difference between
proper or improper mixtures.
Distinction between classical and quantum ‘missing in-
formation’ is a related issue. Quantum discord [41] seems
to be a good way to measure some aspects of the quan-
tumness of information. And as there are states – pointer
states – that are effectively classical, the question arises
as to whether being ignorant of the relatively objective
[15,3] state of the pointer observable (that, as time goes
on, is making more and more imprints on the environ-
ment, ‘advertising’ its states, so that they can be found
out by many without being perturbed) and being igno-
rant of a state of an isolated quantum system differ in
some way.
Quantum Darwinism [3,4,60] sheds a new light on these
issue. According to quantum Darwinism, classicality is
an emergent property of certain observables of a quan-
tum Universe. It arises through selective proliferation
of information about them. Redundancy [3,4,6,60-63] is
the measure of this classicality – observables are effec-
tively classical when they have left many independently
accessible records in the rest of the Universe. Approx-
imate classicality arises when there are very many such
records which can be independently consulted. Such pro-
liferation of information is enough to explain ‘objective
classical reality’ we experience. The idea of using redun-
dancy to disitinguish between classical and quantum has
some ‘prehistory’ [6,61], and its role in the emergence of
objectivity was brought up before [15]. Quantifying re-
dundancy and exploring its consequences is an evolving
subject [3,4,60-63] which has recently led to new insights
into the role of pointer observables and into nature of
“objective existence” in the quantum universe. Indeed,
one can regard it as a modern embodiment of the ideas
of Bohr [44] on the role of amplification.
In light of quantum Darwinism the distinction between
ignorance about the future quantum and classical state
(and, hence, quantum or classical probabilities) can be
understood as follows: When observer knows the preex-
isting state of a single, isolated quantum system, he may
be ignorant of its future post-measurement state (and,
hence, outcome of his about - to - be - carried - out mea-
surement). This ignorance is quantum (or at least it is
not classical) in the sense that the observer cannot dis-
cover what’s already ‘out there’ – there is no ‘classical
reality’ that can be attributed to an isolated state of a
quantum system.
On the other hand, when there are many copies of
the same information (about pointer states), then an ini-
tially ignorant observer will be able to deduce from the
information in the environment which of the the stable
pointer states of the system was responsible for the im-
print. Moreover, he may confirm his deductions obtained
indirectly with a direct measurement (which can be now
designed as non-demolition – observer has enough infor-
mation to know what to measure). In that situation the
assumption that there was a preexisting state of S that
could be found out without being perturbed is (at least
in part) justified by the symptoms.
This relatively objective existence is all quantum the-
ory has to offer to account for ‘classical reality’, but this
seems to be enough. Quantum Darwinism’s account of
the emergence of classical reality is in accord with the
existential interpretation of quantum theory [3,4,8,15].
Equally importantly, it is a good model for how we ac-
quire most of our information – by intercepting a small
fraction of the information present in the photon envi-
ronment.
Envariance - based definition of pointer states should
be explored in much more detail, and its consequences
compared with the more traditional definitions intro-
duced in the studies of decoherence. In simple situations
(e.g., idealized measurements, Refs. [5-9]) there is no
reason to expect any differences with the pointer states
selected by the predictability sieve. However, in realistic
models predictability sieve often leads to overcomplete
sets of pointer states [3,15,39], and then it is not clear
how should one go about deducing pointer states from
envariance.
Above list – definition of systems, proper vs, improper
mixtures, and “pointer states without decoherence” are
just the top three positions of a much longer set of ques-
tions concerning theoretical implications of envariance.
However, over and above all of these items one should
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place a need for a thorough experimental verification of
envariance. To be sure, envariance is a direct consequence
of quantum theory, and quantum theory has been thor-
oughly tested. However, not all of its consequences have
been tested equally thorougly: Superposition principle
is perhaps the most frequently tested of the quantum
principles. Tests of entanglement are more difficult, but
by now are also quite abundant. They have focused on
the violations of Bell’s inequalities and, more recently,
on various applications of entanglement as a resource.
These generally require global state preparations but lo-
cal measurements. Tests of envariance would similarily
require global preparations (of SE state), local manipula-
tions (e.g., swaps), but it would be very desirable to also
have a global final measurement to show that, following
swap in the system, one may restore the pre-swap global
state of the whole with counterswap in the environment.
Untill recently, the combination of preparations, ma-
nipulations, and detections required would have put
experimental verification of envariance squarely in the
‘gedanken’ category, but recent progress in implementing
quantum information processing may place it well within
the range of experimental possibilities. Stakes are high:
Envariance offers the chance to understand the ultimate
origin of probability in physics. The ease with which ig-
norance can be understood in the quantum Universe and
the difficulty of various classical approaches combine to
suggest that perhaps all probabilities in physics are fun-
damentally quantum.
Envariance sheds a new, revealing light on the long
suspected information - theoretic role of quantum states.
Moreover, it provides a new, physically transparent, and
deep foundation for the understanding of the emergence
of the ‘classical reality’ from the quantum substrate. In
particular, envariance provides an excellent example of
the epiontic nature of quantum states [3]: Quantum
states share the role of describing what the observer
knows and what actually exists. In the classical realm
these two functions are cleanly separated. Their ‘quan-
tum inseparability’ was regarded as the source of trouble
for the interpretation of quantum theory. In the envari-
ance - based approach to probabilities it turns out to be
a blessing in disguise – it gives one an objective way to
quantify ignorance, and it leads to Born’s rule for prob-
abilities.
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VIII. APPENDIX A: BORN’S RULE FOR
CONTINUOUS SPECTRA
The derivation of Born’s rule we have put forward in
the body of the paper applies when the number of the
participating Schmidt states is finite. Here I shall extend
first to the case of countably infinite number of states,
and then to the case of continuous spectra (e.g., derive
p(x)dx = |ψ(x)|2dx). There are several ways to proceed.
I shall present (briefly, and to some extent at the expense
of mathematical rigor) the proof that is physically most
straightforward.
The case of infinitely many participating orthonormal
Schmidt states (e.g., Eq. (2a), but with N = ∞) can
be systematically approximated with a sequence of finite
but increasingly large Nδ, chosen to be large enough to
account for almost all likely alternatives. This can be
done by splitting the Schmidt decomposition into a sum
of dominant contributions and a remainder:
|ΨSEC〉 =
Nδ∑
k=1
ak|sk〉|εk〉|ck〉+ (
∞∑
k=Nδ+1
ak|sk〉|εk〉)|cNδ+1〉
=
Nδ∑
k=1
ak|sk〉|εk〉|ck〉+ δ|rNδ+1〉|cNδ+1〉 (A1)
As Nδ increases, terms with the “next largest” |ak| are
moved from the unresolved remainder so that the abso-
lute value of the coefficient δ in front of the normalized
|rNδ+1〉 decreases. Using the previous argument based
on envariance one can readily see that:
∀k≤Nδ pk = p(sk) = p(ck) = |ak|2 (A2)
Moreover, the probability of the remainder is:
p(cNδ+1) = |δ|2 (A3)
It follows that Born’s rule holds for every sk.
The same conclusion can be reached in a slightly more
roundabout way that involves conditional probabilities.
Probability of the remainder is p(cNδ+1) = |δ|2. Condi-
tional probabilities of sk given that k ≤ Nδ are therefore:
pk|k≤Nδ =
|ak|2
1− |δ|2
In the limit of vanishing δ this yields Born’s rule for a se-
quence of two measurements. The outcome of the first is
– in that limit – certain: It establishes that the unknown
state is not a remainder. The second measurement is the
“high resolution” followup.
The case of the continuous ψ(x) can be treated by dis-
cretizing it. The most natural strategy is to introduce a
set of orthogonal basis functions that allow for a discrete
approximation of ψ(x):
|ψ(x)〉 ≈
∑
k
ψk|k⊓〉 . (A4)
For instance, we can choose:
|k⊓〉 = 1 for x ∈ [kδx, (k + 1)δx), 0 otherwise. (A5)
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These functions are neither complete on the real axis, nor
are they normalized:
〈k⊓|k′⊓〉 = δx× δkk′ . (A6)
Normalization can be achieved by dividing each |k⊓〉 by√
δx. The coefficients ψk are given by:
ψk =
1
δx
∫ (k+1)δx
kδx
dx ψ(x) = 〈ψ(x)〉k . (A7)
Now:
|ψ(x)〉 = |Ξ(x)〉+(|ψ(x)〉−|Ξ(x)〉) =
∑
k
ψk|k⊓〉+ |r(x)〉 .
(A8)
Moreover,
〈Ξ(x)|r(x)〉 = 0 , (A9)
as can be seen using Eq. (A7). This orthogonality of
the discrete approximation to the state and the remain-
der is useful (but not essential) to the discussion below.
Furthermore:
〈Ξ(x)|Ξ(x)〉 =
∑
k
|ψk|2δx = 1− |δ|2 ≤ 1 . (A10)
For wave functions that are smooth on small scales in
the limit δx → 0 the norm of the remainder vanishes,
〈r(x)|r(x)〉 = |δ|2 → 0.
One may wonder what happens when ψ(x) is not suf-
ficiently regular on small scales to allow for the discrete
approximation above to go through without complica-
tions. It is indeed possible to imagine, for example, frac-
tal wavefunctions or situations where in addition to con-
tinuous ψ(x) there are discrete points associated with a
non-negligible contribution to the total probability. We
shall bypass issues that arise in such cases. Their treat-
ment is fairly straightforward, and has more to do with
the theory of integration than with physics. Realistic
wavefunctions tend to be sufficiently smooth on small
scales. For ψ(x) finiteness of the total energy usually
suffices to guarantee this.
We can now resume our derivation of Born’s rule. Our
aim is to calculate the probability density associated with
ψ(x). In the limit of very small δx
|〈ψ(x)|Ξ(x)〉|2 = 1− |δ|2 → 1 . (A11)
Therefore, ψ(x) and Ξ(x) have to yield the same prob-
ability density for all measurements. (In effect, we are
using here again the assumption of continuity that was
already invoked in section II).
So, the probabilities of detecting the system within
various position intervals can be inferred using envariance
from the Schmidt decomposition:
|ΥSAE〉 =
∑
k
|ψk|eiφk
√
δx
|k⊓〉√
δx
|Ak〉|εk〉 . (A12)
The set { |k⊓〉√
δx
} is orthonormal (and, hence, can be re-
garded as ‘Schmidt’). Therefore, the complex Schmidt
coefficients above can be used in the proof that is es-
sentially the same as the one given in Sections II and V.
We shall not restate it here in detail (although the reader
may find it entertaining to re-think it in terms of approx-
imate swapping of the sections of ψ(x)). The conclusion
is inescapable: The probability of finding the apparatus
in the state |Ak〉 (and, hence, probability of the system
being found in the interval x ∈ [kδx, (k + 1)δx) is given
by:
pk = |ψk|2δx . (A13)
It also follows that the probability of finding the system
in the larger interval [x1, x2) is:
p(x1 ≤ x < x2) =
∫ x2
x1
dx|ψ(x)|2 . (A14)
This establishes our premise.
As we have already noted, we have “cut corners” and
settled for a physically straightforward argument at the
expense of the mathematical rigor. We note that the ba-
sic structure of the argument can be refined, and that
mathematical rigor can be regained. For instance, there
is no reason to use the same δx everywhere, and one could
improve convergence properties of the discrete approxi-
mation by adapting the resolution of the mesh that is
better adapted to the form of ψ(x). Moreover, the basis
states |k⊓〉 are very artificial and violate the smoothness
assumption we have imposed on ψ(x). They can be easily
replace with more sophisticated orthonormal wavelets.
Such mathematical improvements are beyond the
scope of this work. They help us however make an in-
teresting physical point: Each such new discretization of
ψ(x) defines in effect a new measurement scheme, which
will in turn impose its own definition of what exactly does
it mean for the system to be found in a certain position
interval. It is not essential to have a unique “correct”
scheme. It is however important for all schemes that
can be reasonably regarded as representing an approx-
imate measurement of position should yield compatible
answers. In our case this is guaranteed, as in the limit
of sufficient resolution all legitimate approximations of
ψ(x) are also clearly legitimate approximations of each
other.
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